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Abstract
Making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management, we study the
role that repos play in a bank’s financing structure. In our model the bank’s assets consist of illiq-
uid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos, long–term debt, deposits
and equity. Repos are a cheap source of funding, but they are subject to an exogenous rollover
risk. We show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect (“shadow”) costs on the bank’s
shareholders: first, it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the
additional default risk; second, it adds to the cost of long–term debt financing. These shadow costs
limit the bank’s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding. This effect is, however, weakened
under poor returns on risky assets, access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule. We
also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio, payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the
bank’s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank’s reliance on repos.
Keywords: Bank financing structure; repos; liquid reserves; rollover risk; regulation.
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1. Introduction
What drives the financing decisions of modern banks? The academic literature had, until re-
cently, paid little attention to the determinants of banks’ financing structures. Nowadays, however,
there is a growing interest in this issue,1 since empirical evidence suggests that the composition of
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Jean–Charles Rochet and seminar participants at the University of Zurich, ETH Zurich, University of St. Gallen,
the 25th CEPR European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets (ESSFM) and two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments and suggestions. The research leading to these results has received funding from the ERC (grant
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Institute (project “Systemic Risk and Dynamic Contract Theory”), and it is gratefully acknowledged.
∗Corresponding author.
1Theoretical treatments of this topic essentially rely on the application of structural models to banking (see e.g.,
Hugonnier and Morellec (2015), Sundaresan and Wang (2015)).
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banks’ liabilities is far richer than a simple mix of equity and insured deposits.2 In particular, in the
years preceding the Global Financial Crisis, short–term wholesale debt gained popularity, as it was
considered to be a relatively cheap source of funding.3 This cost advantage was particularly relevant
in the case of repos, due to their deposit–like nature, their safe harbor provisions and the investors’
preferences for safe and liquid investments. However, the example of Northern Rock, brought to
the edge of failure in 2008 by a run of its wholesale creditors, clearly shows that an overreliance on
short–term funding may render a bank particularly fragile.
This paper develops a theoretical framework to gain insights into the main drivers behind banks’
financing structures and, in particular, the maturity composition of debt. In our model, a bank can
be financed by a combination of (i) short–term, secured debt that we refer to as “repos”, (ii) long–
term, risky debt, (iii) insured deposits, and (iv) equity. The main question we address deals with
the choice between repos and long–term, risky debt. The former is relatively cheap but it is subject
to an exogenous run of the repo creditors, whereas the latter represents a stable but costlier source
of funding. The asset side of the bank’s balance sheet consists of risky, illiquid assets and liquid
reserves that earn no interest. The level of liquid reserves fluctuates over time and is controlled via
a payout policy. The bank may draw from its liquid reserves to ensure the continuity of interest
payments on debt. Moreover, liquid reserves serve as a buffer against the withdrawal losses that
may be caused by a run of the repo creditors. These two features lead to an interaction between the
bank’s financing structure and its liquidity management policy, which turns out to be crucial for
our results. The bank’s liquidation policy is also related to the dynamics of its liquid reserves: in an
unregulated environment, running out of liquid reserves triggers the bank’s liquidation, as the bank
defaults on its debt.4 On the other hand, when the bank faces capital or liquidity requirements, a
regulation–triggered liquidation might occur at strictly positive levels of the liquid reserves.
We begin by providing a formal characterization of the bank’s optimal financing and payout
decisions, which are jointly determined in our framework. As it is the case in many inventory models
(see e.g., Jeanblanc and Shiryaev (1995) and Décamps et al. (2011)) and in recent contributions
that simultaneously deal with financing and payout decisions (see e.g., Bolton et al. (2014) and
Hugonnier and Morellec (2015)), the bank retains earnings below a certain level of liquid reserves
and only distributes dividends whenever its liquid reserves reach this target level. The choice of
the latter depends on the bank’s financing structure, which affects the cost of financing and, thus,
2For example, according to Gropp and Heider (2010), non–deposit sources of funding constituted about 30% of
the liabilities of European banks in 2004. The snapshot of the U.S. bank holding companies reported in Hanson et al.
(2011) suggests that deposits amount to roughly half of a bank’s liabilities, whereas the remainder represents a mix
of wholesale/retail non–deposit funding and equity.
3For example, Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) provide evidence of the growing importance of short–term funding
for European banks: in 2011, 18% of the total assets of U.S. money market funds were short–term loans provided to
European banks.
4We assume that illiquid bank assets cannot be partially liquidated.
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the dynamics of the bank’s earnings. On the other hand, the choice of the financing structure
depends itself on the target level of liquid reserves, since the latter affects the risk of liquidation
and, therefore, the cost of long–term, risky debt.
We first solve the model numerically for a hypothetical bank that has no deposits in its financing
structure and faces no regulation. Our analysis shows that including repos in the liability structure
might help reduce the overall financing costs, thereby, increasing the bank’s ex–ante value. However,
the presence of repos in the bank’s financing structure inflicts two types of indirect costs on its
shareholders, which are labeled throughout the paper shadow costs. First, to mitigate the additional
default risk caused by the possibility of a run on repos, the bank must target a higher level of liquid
reserves (which earn no returns). Second, the use of repos gives rise to an additional component in
the spread of the long–term risky debt, which can be interpreted as an extra premium rewarding
the long–term creditors for the negative externalities imposed on them by the (possible) run of the
repo creditors. The existence of these shadow costs plays a disciplining role by curbing the bank’s
incentives to excessively rely on cheap but unstable repos.
Interestingly, the magnitude of the extra premium on long–term debt resulting from the use of
repos is closely related to the bank’s ability to maintain high levels of liquid reserves. In particular,
it is lower for the banks with higher returns on risky assets, as they are able, by increasing their
target levels of liquid reserves, to better handle the additional default risk inflicted by the use of
repos. For these banks, the relative cost advantage of repos is not substantial. In contrast, banks
with lower returns on risky asset cannot afford to implement substantial upward adjustments of their
liquid reserves and, as a consequence, must offer a higher compensation to their long–term creditors,
which magnifies the initial cost advantage of repos over long–term, risky debt. This effect, which
works through the interaction channel between the financing costs and the optimal management of
liquidity, adds to the standard franchise–value effect that drives the shareholders’ aversion to the
run–triggered liquidation risk. As a result, banks with lower returns on risky assets exhibit higher
proportions of repos in their financing structures.
On the second stage of our numerical analysis, we reexamine the bank’s financing decisions
allowing for access to (insured) deposit funding, whose volume is taken as given. Notably, the
access to deposit funding induces the bank to increase its reliance on repos. The reason is that a
larger volume of insured deposits in the bank’s liability structure reduces the effective bank earnings.
The resulting effect is, therefore, qualitatively similar to the effect of lowering the effective return
on risky assets: namely, the access to deposit funding induces a bank to increase its reliance on
repos. Furthermore, this effect becomes more pronounced when the insured deposits are senior to
the long–term, risky debt. The seniority of the insured deposit over the long–term debt implies
that long–term creditors receive a lower value in the case of a bank liquidation and, thus, demand
a higher interest rate. This amplifies the cost advantage of repo financing even further.
Once we have studied the financing decisions of an unregulated bank, we consider the impact
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of different regulatory measures on a bank’s ex–ante choice of financing structure. After the Global
Financial Crisis, over–reliance on short–term debt funding in the banking sector was perceived as
socially dangerous and became a serious concern for bank regulators. In this light, it is useful to gain
a better understanding of how different regulatory measures affect a bank’s appetite for short–term
funding. We examine the effects of three regulatory tools: liquidity regulation in the spirit of the
Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio, payout restrictions and a leverage ratio. Overall, our analysis
shows that each of these tools is capable of reducing the banks’ reliance on repos. Under liquidity
regulation, which requires the bank to maintain a minimum level of liquid reserves as a certain
proportion of its volume of repos, the bank substitutes repo funding by long–term debt. Payout
restrictions induce a similar substitution effect: when forced to operate with higher target levels of
liquid reserves, the bank benefits from lower costs of long–term debt financing, which downplays
the cost advantage of repos. Leverage regulation, on the other hand, induces the bank to lower its
volumes of both repos and long–term debt. Put into the perspective of current policy debates, this
set of results suggests that developing special liquidity regulation in order to reduce a reliance of
banks on repos might be redundant.
Related literature. Our paper belongs to the burgeoning body of literature that examines the
interaction between the optimal capital structure and liquidity management (see e.g., Gryglewicz
(2011), Bolton et al. (2014) and Hugonnier and Morellec (2015)). In these works, the capital struc-
ture affects the liquidity reserves through interest payments on debt. However, these models allow
exclusively for a single type of debt (perpetual one) in the financing structure, thereby disregarding
the debt–maturity–choice dimension. In our model, we introduce an additional type of debt with
a short maturity (repos) and bring into focus the trade–off between financing costs and stability.
Allowing for repos in the bank’s financing structure creates an additional channel of interaction
between liquidity management and capital structures, given that liquid reserves serve as a buffer
against the withdrawal losses generated by a run of repo creditors. This feature plays an important
role in our analysis, since the bank’s ability to build larger liquid reserves has direct implications on
its optimal debt–structure choices. At the same time, it marks a key difference between our frame-
work and the existing structural models that deal with rollover risk such as He and Xiong (2012b),
and He and Milbradt (2014, 2015), where rollover losses are absorbed by the shareholders’ “deep
pockets”. Those models, however, focus on the impact of rollover risk on the endogenous default
decisions. In our baseline setting, default occurs as soon as the liquid reserves are depleted, but
the likelihood of running out of liquidity is strongly affected by both the payout and the financing
decisions of the bank.
An additional key departure of our work from the papers by He and Xiong (2012b), He and
Milbradt (2014, 2015) pertains to the approach to modeling the rollover risk. In their models, all
debt is risky and the maturities are uniformly distributed (like in the setting of Leland and Toft
(1996)). Maturing debt has to be replaced at a market price, which might be above or below its
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face value, thereby leading to rollover gains/losses. In the present paper we adopt an alternative
approach to modeling rollover risk by considering its materialization as an exogenous run of repo
creditors. This is motivated by the anecdotal evidence that the large actors of repo markets, such as
money–market mutual funds, and even traditional banks, may face sudden liquidity needs caused
by a run of their own clients/creditors, which, in turn, will push them to pull their short–term
investments back.5
Our paper is also related to the literature on the optimal maturity composition of debt. When
exploring this issue, some papers place emphasis on the role that short–term debt plays in resolving
various kinds of agency problems (see e.g., Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Eisenbach (2014), Diamond
and He (2014)). Alternatively, Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) show that short–term debt ma-
turity may be an equilibrium outcome when a debt issuer is unable to commit to a predetermined
maturity structure. We assume, instead, that the only benefit of using short–term secured debt
stems from its lower cost and focus on the impact that its presence has on the long–term debt’s
cost. In this regard, our model is complementary to the work by Auh and Sundaresan (2014), who
study a similar question within the context of a Leland–type structural model. The main feature
that distinguishes our model from theirs is the fact that we allow for the joint choice of the opti-
mal debt structure and liquidity management and, thereby, aim to capture the link between the
composition of the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet. In a recent contribution, He and
Milbradt (2015) study the fully dynamic choice of optimal debt maturity in a setting with a fric-
tionless equity market. In their model, a firm can instantaneously modify its average debt maturity
by substituting a fraction of the maturing long–term bonds by short–term ones (or vice versa).
Increasing the fraction of debt with shorter maturity reduces the current rollover losses (that must
be offset by new equity issuances), as it has a lower default risk and, thus, a higher price than debt
with a longer maturity. However, this also increases the rollover frequency in the future, thereby
increasing the default probability.6 A similar trade–off between the lower cost of funding and the
additional default risk inherent in short–term funding is a key driver of the results in our setting.
Nevertheless, the fact that our debt maturity structure is static enables us to address the optimal
choice of financing structure, whereas in He and Milbradt (2015) the latter is taken as exogenous.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
provides a formal characterization of the bank’s policies. In Section 4 we conduct a numerical
analysis to identify the determinants of the bank’s financing structure. In Section 5 we examine
the impact of different regulatory measures on the bank’s funding decisions. Section 6 concludes.
5A substantial body of literature dealing with rollover risk considers runs as a consequence of the coordination
problem between the maturing creditors in the context of deteriorating fundamentals (see e.g., Cheng and Milbradt
(2012), He and Xiong (2012a), Liang et al. (2014)). In these models, the short–term creditors run as soon as the value
of the firm’s fundamentals falls below a certain critical threshold. In the present paper we abstain from rationalizing
runs on repos, and focus instead on the implication of runs for the financing and payout policies of banks.
6This mechanism is also key in Della Seta et al. (2015).
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Proofs and other mathematical material are gathered in the Appendices.
2. The Model
We work in a continuous–time, infinite–horizon setting, in which all agents are risk neutral and
discount the future cash flows at a rate ρ > 0. A group of equity investors holds a banking license
and has to decide on the financing structure of a new bank. The bank’s assets comprise liquid
reserves and a portfolio of risky assets of a fixed size A. A fraction (1− η)A of the risky assets, for
η ∈ (0, 1) given, consists of illiquid loans that have zero value in the case of bank liquidation.7 The
remaining fraction ηA corresponds to the assets that hold their value in the case of bank liquidation
and, therefore, can be used as collateral for secured borrowing transactions (e.g., sovereign bonds,
agency CMOs, some approved ABS, etc.). Once the bank has been established, the risky assets
generate the cash flows8
µdt+ σdW (t),
where µdt denotes the expected return on risky assets per unit of time, σ represents the volatility
of asset returns and W =
{
W (t), t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion, defined on the standard
probability space
(
Ω,F ,P) that generates the filtration F = {Ft, t ≥ 0}. The bank’s revenues are
taxed at a fixed rate θ ∈ (0, 1).
Bank balance sheet. The bank’s assets may be financed using a mixture of insured deposits and
the following types of securities: repos, long–term, risky debt and equity. To introduce the risk of
liquidation in our model, we assume that there is no access to capital markets after the bank has
been created.9 When choosing the bank’s financing structure, its shareholders take the cost and the
volume of insured deposits as given and decide on how to complement the latter with non–deposit
sources of funding. Throughout the paper, our analysis is centered around the choice of the initial
financing structure, without allowing for any further adjustments. Although this rigid structure is
assumed for technical reasons, it can be justified through the empirical evidence suggesting that the
7This assumption stems from the fact that the value of bank loans largely depends on the bank’s private informa-
tion, which cannot be easily transmitted to a new owner. It can be relaxed with minor modifications.
8In contrast with the Leland (1994)-type structural models, where the firm’s asset cash–flow/asset value evolves
according to a geometric Brownian motion, here the bank’s cash flows follow an arithmetic Brownian motion. This
is compatible with the fact that the bank’s productive assets have a fixed size and it makes liquid reserves relevant.
Indeed, in the presence of financial frictions, the fact that the evolution of the cash flows can oscillate vertically means
that the bank may suffer operational losses that must be offset by its liquid reserves (here we assume an extreme form
of financing frictions where the bank has no access to equity market after it starts operating, but the same insight
would be relevant if we allowed for costly recapitalizations). Even though very stylized, this specification allows us
to consider the link between the composition of the asset and liability sides of the bank’s balance sheet. On the
other hand, an underlying assumption in the Leland–type models is that shareholders bear no costs when raising
new equity. As a result, there is no room for liquid reserves: all profits are distributed as dividends and all losses are
offset via new equity issuances, as long as it is optimal to maintain the firm (bank) afloat.
9Allowing for uncertain recapitalization possibilities would not qualitatively alter our results.
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capital structure of a bank is highly persistent and changes slowly over time (see e.g., IMF Global
Financial Stability Report (2013)). The structure of the bank’s balance sheet implied by our model
is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: The bank’s balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Liquid reserves, C(t) Deposits, Pd
Risky assets, A ≡ (1− θ)µ/ρ Repos, Ps
Long-term debt, Pl
Equity, C(t) +A− Pd − Ps − Pl
In order to formally state the decision problem of the bank’s shareholders at the time of the
investment, we start by describing the menu of funding sources and their respective costs. Next, we
characterize the dynamics of the liquid reserves and specify the values of the bank’s securities.
The types of debt funding and their corresponding costs. Deposits in our model are insured
by a deposit–insurance fund and take the form of perpetual debt with a face value of Pd. The overall
cost of deposit funding to the bank amounts to rdPddt per unit of time, where rd encompasses the
rate of the interest payments made to depositors, as well as the deposit–insurance and management
costs. Throughout the paper both Pd and rd are taken as exogenous.
The non–deposit sources of debt financing consist of repos (instantaneously maturing, secured
debt) with a volume of Ps ≤ ηA10 and long–term debt with a face value of Pl. We focus on the
case where the long–term debt is risky regardless of the level of repos, which requires the condition
Pl > ηA. Repos are instantaneously rolled over, whereas the long–term debt takes the form of a
perpetual bond. The repo creditors benefit from a so–called safe–harbor provision, which spares
them from any losses in the case of a bank liquidation (this is the case under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code). This implies that the long–term, risky debt is junior to repos. However, the long–term debt
may be junior or senior to the insured deposits (we analyze the impact of the seniority rules in
Section 4.2).
The bank’s creditors are assumed to be subject to exogenous liquidity shocks, whose arrivals
are described by the Poisson process N =
{
N(t), t ≥ 0} with intensity λ. When hit by a liquidity
shock, the repo creditors stop rolling their debt over.11 The long–term creditors, on the other hand,
10This collateral constraint states that, by liquidating its core assets, a bank is always able to repay repo creditors,
even when there are no liquid reserves left. In other words, the repo creditors bear no risk. As we show in our
numerical analysis, for reasonable level of parameter values (namely, when η is not too low) this constraint is never
binding and thus has no direct impact on the optimal choice of financing structure.
11This situation may occur when the bank engages in repo transactions with a Money Market Mutual Fund
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are “locked in”. We define the (stopping) time when the repo creditors run as
τ∗ := inf
{
t > 0 : N(t) = 1
}
.
For simplicity, we rule out the possibility of additional repo sales once the run of the incumbent
creditors has occurred.12
The repo funding costs the bank rsPsdt per unit of time. Since repos are fully collateralized, the
interest rate rs < ρ does not reflect the bank’s liquidation risk13 and it is exogenous (e.g., a 1–year
LIBOR). The long–term debt funding costs the bank rlPldt per unit of time, and the interest rate
rl ≥ ρ is chosen endogenously at the time of investment so as to compensate the long–term creditors
for the liquidation risk they bear.14 It is worth mentioning that, even if the long–term debt were not
subject to any liquidation risk, the long–term creditors would be compensated at a higher rate than
the repo ones. The reason being that, in contrast to the repo creditors, the long–term creditors are
unable to withdraw their funds in the case of a liquidity shock. As a result, their default–free rate
should comprise an illiquidity premium. An alternative interpretation one may provide, based on
standard liquidity arguments (see e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Gorton and Metrick (2010) or
Stein (2012)), is that the repo creditors derive additional utility from holding liquid claims. Hence,
they accept to be compensated at a lower rate.
As will become apparent below, the impact of repos on the overall cost of debt financing is
ambiguous. On the one hand, repos may be viewed as a cheaper source of funding. On the other
hand, increasing their proportion in the bank’s liability structure simultaneously increases the risk
of liquidation15 and reduces the value accruing to the unsecured creditors in such a case, thereby
amplifying the costs of long–term debt financing.
The dynamics of the liquid reserves. For a given cost structure of debt financing, the bank’s
(MMMF). As argued by Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), the concerns of the MMMF’s investors about some of its
assets may induce them to pull their money back, which triggers subsequent cuts in funding of totally credit–worthy
firms financed through this fund (a negative spill–over effect). In other words, a materialization of the rollover risk
may not necessarily be triggered by the investors’ concerns about the quality of the bank’ assets, but may simply
represent a negative externality of the excessive risk–taking by the provider of short–term funding. This argument
underlies the assumption of an exogenous run in our model. We refer the reader to e.g. Liang et al. (2015) for a
mathematically–rigorous discussion of how, in a dynamic structural model, the run intensity can be endogenously
determined as a strategic decision of the banks’ creditors.
12In fact, in the short run, the bank may be unable to replace its usual provider of short–term funding because of
information asymmetries or even institutional frictions corresponding to the fact that the MMMFmight be constrained
by its board to lend only to a pre–approved number of counterparties (see Chernenko and Sunderam (2014)).
13We first study an unregulated setting, in which liquidation and default coincide. That is to say that the bank’s
shareholders will never default strategically at any positive level of liquidity, when the bank can still service its debt.
When facing regulation, however, it might occur that the bank is subject to intervention before it becomes illiquid.
14Note that the use of long–term debt financing in our set–up is optimal due to the presence of tax benefits, whereas
the motivation for repo financing mainly stems from their relative cost advantage.
15In this light, one can interpret the use of repo financing as taking on tail on the liability side of the balance sheet.
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cumulative, after–tax earnings R = {R(t), t ≥ 0} evolve in the following way:
R(t) = (1− θ)
[
(µ− rdPd − rlPl − 1{t≤τ∗}rsPs)t+ σW (t)
]
,
where 1{·} is the zero–one indicator function reflecting the fact that, if it were to withstand a run
of the repo creditors, the bank would continue operating without repos on its balance sheet.
The after–tax earnings can be distributed to the bank’s shareholders or they may be retained
as liquid reserves. Maintaining liquid reserves, however, involves dead–weight costs that we capture
via the assumption that no interest accrues on them.16 We model the cumulative payouts made
to the shareholders up to time t via a F–adapted, non–decreasing process L = {L(t), t ≥ 0}. For
any initial level of liquid reserves c0 ≥ 0 (which in equilibrium will be optimally chosen so as to
maximize the ex–ante shareholder value), the financing and payout decisions can be described by a
strategy pi = (Ps, Pl, L). We define by
S := {pi : Ps ≤ ηA, and L is non–decreasing}
the set of admissible strategies that can be adopted by the bank’s management. The liquid–reserves
process Cpi = {Cpi(t), t ≥ 0} associated to a strategy pi ∈ S satisfies
Cpi(t) = c0 +R(t)− L(t)− 1{t≤τ∗}PsN(t), (1)
where the last term on the right–hand side reflects the fact that the liquid reserves may be subject
to a large negative shock whose scale corresponds to the volume of the withdrawn repo funding.17
The indicator function captures the fact that no re–issuance of repos takes place once the run
has occurred, although the bank may very well remain in operation, provided that its reserves are
sufficient to absorb the withdrawal loss.
We denote by c ≥ 0 the level of liquid reserves at which the bank is liquidated and by τpi the
corresponding liquidation time, defined for any strategy pi ∈ S as
τpi := inf
{
t > 0 : Cpi(t) < c
}
.
In the absence of regulation, and due to the limited liability of the bank’s shareholders, it is subop-
timal for them to liquidate the bank at a positive level of liquid reserves, hence c = 0. This obeys
the fact that the recovery value for the shareholders in the case of liquidation is always dominated
by that of the bank as an ongoing concern. Technically speaking, the marginal value of liquid re-
16This assumption also enables us to obtain closed–form expressions for the values of the bank’s liabilities.
17We assume that, in the case of a run, all the repo creditors pull their funds back simultaneously, as it happened,
for example, in case of Lehman Brothers.
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serves in the bank is always larger than or equal to one, as will be shown in the upcoming sections.
Therefore, early liquidation is inefficient from the shareholders’ perspective. However, as we show
in Section 5, imposing liquidity or capital regulation on the bank may result in a strictly positive
liquidation threshold, which would itself depend on the bank’s financing structure.
It is important to notice that, in our setting, liquidation may be triggered by either the run
of the repo creditors, should it occur when the level of liquid reserves Cpi(t) ∈ [c, c + Ps), or by
a series of poor performances, in which case the liquid reserves get depleted gradually following
adverse realizations of the Brownian risk. This shows that the role of the liquid reserves is twofold:
First, they help the bank hedge against adverse profitability shocks and ensure the continuity of
debt servicing. Second, they serve as a buffer against a possible large loss caused by the run of the
repo creditors.
The shareholders’ problem. In order to formalize the problem of the bank’s shareholders, we
first define the ex–ante value of equity corresponding to a strategy pi and an initial level of liquid
reserves c0 :
Upi(c0) := E0
[∫ τpi
0
e−ρtdL(t)
]
. (2)
The term inside the conditional expectation reflects the present value of the cumulated dividend
payments to shareholders until the time of liquidation. In the absence of regulatory requirements, the
shareholders walk away empty–handed in such a case.18 At this point some clarification regarding
τpi and τ∗ is in order. Since liquidation need not be implied by a repo run, the set {τ∗ < τpi} is
of positive measure. In other words, Expression (2) implicitly contains τ∗. This will prove to be
relevant in the dynamic–programming approach that we take in the sequel. On the other hand,
liquidation may be triggered by the run, in which case τ∗ = τpi.
The bank’s shareholders choose among the set of all admissible financing and payout strategies
S, so as to maximize the value of their equity, net of their initial investment expenditure. For a
given choice of c0, the total amount of funds that must be raised to establish the bank is A+c0. The
difference between the total investment costs and the funding raised, namely (A+c0)−(Pd+Pl+Ps),
is financed by equity. The shareholders’ optimization problem can then be stated as follows:
max
c0≥0,pi∈S
V pi(c0) :=
{
Upi(c0)− (A+ c0 − Pd − Pl − Ps)
}
. (3)
The ex–ante market value of long–term debt under the strategy pi is the expected value of the
sum of the discounted, cumulated interest payments until the time of liquidation, plus the liquidation
18This is not necessarily the case in the presence of regulation, where the term E0[u˜(Cpi(τpi))] (the shareholders’
payoff at liquidation) should be added to Upi(c0).
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value accruing to the long–term creditors in such an event:19
Dpi(c0) := E0
[∫ τpi
0
e−ρtrlPldt+ e−ρτpi d˜(Cpi(τpi))
]
.
The value d˜(Cpi(τpi)) accruing to the long–term creditors in the event of liquidation depends on the
long–term debt’s seniority relative to that of the insured deposits, as well as on whether or not the
run of the repo creditors has already taken place. We assume that the long–term debt is issued in
a competitive market with rational creditors, so that its interest rate is chosen so as to ensure the
parity between its face and market values, i.e. Dpi(c0) = Pl, which implicitly defines the long–term
interest rate rl.
In order to provide some intuition regarding the solution to the shareholders’ problem, we point
out that the optimal payout strategy is of the so–called barrier type. As we formally show below,
it is characterized by an optimal payout barrier (or, equivalently, an optimal target level of liquid
reserves) such that all liquid reserves beyond the said barrier are distributed as dividends, while
no payouts take place as long as the level of liquid reserves remains below this threshold. We
will show that, in general, the optimal initial level of liquid reserves c0 coincides with the optimal
target level of liquid reserves.20 This choice determines the ex–ante distance to liquidation and,
therefore, impacts the cost of long–term debt financing via the relation Dpi(c0) = Pl. This is, in
fact, the channel through which the payout policy affects the choice of the financing structure in
our model. Simultaneously, one observes in the reserves–dynamics Equation (1) that the choice
of the financing structure feeds back into the dynamics of the liquid reserves through the costs of
debt servicing and, furthermore, through the scale of the rollover risk exposure.21 As we show in
the upcoming sections, this feedback mechanism plays an important role in determining the bank’s
optimal financing structure.
3. The Financing and Payout Decisions of an Unregulated Bank
We consider, initially, the optimal payout policy and the values of the securities of a bank
assuming it has survived the run of the repo creditors. The closed–form solutions for the values
of equity and debt defined in this setting will be later used as building blocks for constructing the
solution to the shareholders’ problem at initiation. Moreover, this setting will serve as a useful
benchmark needed to assess the impact of the repo funding on the optimal financing and payout
decisions of the bank’s management in the numerical analysis that we perform in Section 4.
19Notice that the above comment regarding the implicit presence of τ∗ in Upi(c0) also applies to Dpi(c0).
20This is no longer true when payout restrictions are imposed by the regulator (see Section 5.2).
21The presence of an endogenous tail risk, related to the use of repo funding, marks the key difference between our
framework and the one considered by Bolton et al. (2014).
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3.1. The payout policy and the values of the bank’s securities after the run
The post–run value of equity. As we have mentioned above, a run by the repo creditors does
not necessarily imply the liquidation of the bank. This suggests that one may take a dynamic–
programming approach so as to determine the value of the bank’s liabilities. In other words, the
expected present values of bank equity and long–term debt without repos in the bank’s liability
structure are to be used to determine the initial values of equity and debt. To this end, let us
assume that the bank has withstood the run of the repo creditors and now operates without repos
in its liabilities. In this section we take (rl, Pl) as given and study the properties of the equity value
function22
U0(c) := sup
L
U (0,Pl,L)(c), c ≥ c.
The formal derivation of the properties of U0 that we discuss in the sequel may be found in
Appendix A.1. Since for any time horizon the probability of liquidation is decreasing in the level
of liquid reserves, the marginal value of liquid reserves decreases with c, as it is the case in several
inventory models with pure equity financing (see e.g., Jeanblanc and Shiryaev (1995), Milne and
Robertson (1996) and Décamps et al. (2011)). This implies that the equity value function U0,
which is clearly increasing in the level of liquid reserves, is concave.23 It is then optimal to retain
earnings below a certain critical barrier b∗0 that corresponds to the level of liquid reserves at which
the marginal value of an additional unit of retained earnings equals the marginal value of distributed
dividends, i.e. U ′0(b∗0) = 1. In the sequel we refer to the interval (c, b∗0) as the retention region. Let
us denote by f0 := rlPl + rdPd the instantaneous cost of debt financing after the run. The following
result offers a convenient differential characterization of the equity value function U0.
Theorem 1. In the region (c, b∗0), the equity value function U0 is concave and it satisfies the ordi-
nary differential equation
ρU0(c) = (1− θ)2σ
2
2
U ′′0 (c) + (1− θ)(µ− f0)U ′0(c), (4)
together with the Neumann boundary conditions U ′0(b∗0) = 1 and U ′′0 (b∗0) = 0.
For each choice of rl and Pl, Equation (4) has the general solution
A(rl, Pl)e
β1c +B(rl, Pl)e
β2c,
where β1 = β1(rl, Pl) > 0 and β2 = β2(rl, Pl) < 0 are the roots of the characteristic polynomial of
Equation (4).
22Recall that, for the unregulated bank, c = 0. Nevertheless, throughout this section we define the values of the
contingent claims for any c ≥ 0, so as to exploit the obtained results in the setting where regulation is present.
23The concavity of the equity value function can be interpreted as a sort of “corporate” risk aversion arising from
the risk of liquidation (see e.g., Milne and Robertson (1996) for a discussion on this phenomenon).
12
Whenever the current level of liquid reserves c exceeds b∗0, the shareholders’ impatience outweighs
their concerns regarding liquidation, and the difference c−b∗0 is immediately distributed as dividends.
In other words, in the region (b∗0,∞) the equity value function is affine:
U0(c) = U0(b
∗
0) + c− b∗0. (5)
Our strategy to find U0 is to take an arbitrary target level of liquid reserves b0 > 0 and, using
Equations (5) and (4) together with the conditions U ′0(b0) = 1 and U ′′0 (b0) = 0, to determine a
candidate equity value function. Then, the optimal payout barrier can be recovered by using the
boundary condition
U0(c) = max{ηA+ c− Pd − Pl, 0} =: u˜0(c), (6)
where u˜0(c) is the value accruing to the shareholders in the event of liquidation. It is important to
notice that Theorem 1 only provides us with necessary conditions for optimality. Therefore, if we
obtain a candidate for the equity value function by means of the HJB Equation (4) we must verify
that it really corresponds to the shareholder’s optimal equity value. This, naturally, is equivalent
to making sure that the proposed optimal strategy is indeed value maximizing. We do this in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. For a given debt structure (Pl, Pd) and the interest rate on long–term debt rl, the
post-run value of equity is given by
U0(c; b
∗
0) :=

1
β1−β2
[− β2β1 eβ1(c−b∗0) + β1β2 eβ2(c−b∗0)], for c ∈ [c, b∗0),
(1−θ)(µ−f0)
ρ + c− b∗0, for c ≥ b∗0.
(7)
The optimal, cumulative–dividend policy L∗ acts on the liquid–reserves process Cpi so as to keep it
at or below the payout barrier b∗0 = b∗0(rl, Pl), which is the unique solution to the equation U0(c; b∗0) =
u˜0(c).
In Appendix A.2 we provide a verification theorem showing that U0(c; b∗0) is, indeed, the value
function, i.e. the equation U0(c; b∗0) = U0(c) is satisfied for all c ≥ c. When c = 0, the target level
of liquid reserves defined via Equation (6) can be given explicitly:
b∗0 =
1
β1 − β2 log
(β2
β1
)2
.
The long–term debt’s post–run value. Let us now look at the long–term debt’s market value,
which we denote by D0 in this benchmark case. This value will depend critically on the payout
policy chosen by the bank’s shareholders but, as long as rl is assumed to be fixed, the long–term
creditors are passive and take the payout barrier as given. Therefore, we study the properties of D0
for a fixed, arbitrary payout barrier b0. By standard arguments, D0 satisfies the following differential
13
equation:
ρD0(c) = (1− θ)2σ
2
2
D′′0(c) + (1− θ)(µ− f0)D′0(c) + rlPl for c ∈ (c, b0). (8)
In order to determine D0, we need two boundary conditions. Since the optimal payout policy
implies that the level of liquid reserves never exceeds b0 for t > 0, the long–term debt’s value
remains constant for any c that is greater than or equal to b0. Thus, it must hold that D′0(b0) = 0.
The second boundary condition is imposed at the liquidation threshold c. Specifically, we have
D0(c) = d˜0, where d˜0 = ηA(< Pl) if the long–term debt is senior to the insured deposits and d˜0 =
max{ηA − Pd, 0} otherwise. Solving Equation (8) with the above–mentioned boundary conditions
yields the following closed–form characterization of the market value of debt:
D0(c; b0) =
rlPl
ρ
−
(
rlPl
ρ
− d˜0
)[
β1e
β1b0+β2c − β2eβ2b0+β1c
β1eβ1b0+β2c − β2eβ2b0+β1c
]
, (9)
where the first term represents the perpetual value of the interest payments and the second term
captures the impact of the liquidation and payout policies.
With the post–run values of equity and debt in hand, we are now in the position to define the
values of the bank’s securities and the optimal payout policy before the run.
3.2. The value of the bank’s securities and the payout policy before the run
We now consider the optimal financing and payout policies when the bank has access to both
long–term debt and repo financing. The main departure from the results obtained in Section 3.1 is
due to the possibility of a run by the repo creditors. On the one hand, this allows for liquidation
at levels of liquid reserves that are strictly higher than c. On the other hand, conditional on the
bank surviving a run, the dynamics of the liquid reserves experience a regime change, since the cost
of debt servicing per unit of time will be reduced by rsPsdt. These two facts notwithstanding, as
long as a run on the repos does not occur, the optimal payout policy of the bank does not deviate
significantly from that pertaining to the case considered in Section 3.1. More specifically, we show
in Appendix B that, given a debt structure (Ps, Pl) and a long–term interest rate rl, there exists
a target level of liquid reserves b∗1(rl, Ps, Pl) ≥ 0 such that, as long as there is no run on repos,
dividends are distributed so as to maintain the level of liquid reserves at or below b∗1.24
The pre–run value of equity. As before, the value the of payout barrier b∗1 is closely related to
24For ease of reading, and as long as there are no grounds for confusion, we will refrain from writing the arguments
of b∗1 in the text.
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the bank’s equity value function. Given the pair (Ps, Pl), the latter is defined as25
U1(c) := sup
L
U (Ps,Pl,L)(c).
We show in Appendix A.1 that U1 is a concave function of the level of liquid reserves for the same
reasons as U0. Moreover, U1 is also affine beyond the pre–run dividend barrier. Namely, for c > b∗1,
we have
U1(c) = U1(b
∗
1) + c− b∗1.
However, for c ∈ (c, b∗1), the characterization of U1 strongly depends on the choice of the payout
barrier b∗1. Depending on the choice of the capital structure and the underlying parameters value,
the bank may end up in one of three potential scenarios: If b∗1 ∈ (c, c+Ps], the bank will always be
liquidated in the case of a run by the repo creditors. In the case where b∗1 ∈ (c + Ps, c + Ps + b∗0],
two outcomes are possible: If the liquid reserves suffice to absorb a loss caused by a creditors’ run,
i.e. if c > c+ Ps, then the bank survives, switches regime and follows the payout policy defined in
Section 3.1. In contrast, if the run occurs when c ∈ [c, c+ Ps], then the bank is liquidated. Finally,
if b∗1 > c + Ps + b∗0 and a run occurs while c ∈ (c + Ps + b∗0, b∗1], then the bank makes a lump–sum
payment of size (c−Ps)−b∗0 to shareholders immediately after the run, and then follows the optimal
payout strategy defined in Section 3.1.
Since it is not possible to distinguish between these scenarios from an ex–ante perspective, one
would be forced to characterize candidates for the optimal equity value function in each scenario
and then perform a numerical analysis to see how the model’s parameters affect the choice of b∗1. In
our analysis, however, we focus solely on the case where b∗1 ∈ (c+Ps, c+Ps + b∗0]. On the one hand,
this turns out to be the only case that manifests itself for the range of parameters that we use in our
numerical simulations. On the other hand, the first and third scenarios are somehow pathological.
Namely, neither setting a target reserves level that guarantees liquidation in the case of a run by the
repo creditors, nor setting a target reserves level that opens the possibility of a lump–sum payment
to shareholders after the run are particularly palatable from an economic perspective.
In order to simplify the presentation, let us introduce the following operator:
Lg := (1− θ)2σ
2
2
g′′ + (1− θ)(µ− f1)g′ − ρg,
where f1 := rdPd + rlPl + rsPs and g is any twice continuously differentiable function.
25It should be noted that U0 is hidden in U1(c), the reason being that the shareholders’ (rational) choice of L
takes into account the scenarios where a run by the repo creditors does not trigger liquidation. This is where the
aforementioned dynamic–programming approach comes into play and it is manifest in Expressions (10)–(12) below.
For ease of reading we abstain from presenting here the extended expression for U1(c), but provide it within the proof
of Theorem 2 in Appendix A.1.
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Theorem 2. If the condition b∗1 ∈ (c+Ps, c+Ps + b∗0] holds ex–post, then the equity value function
U1 is concave and it satisfies the following system:
LU1(c)− λ[U1(c)− u˜1(c)] = 0, c ∈ (c, c+ Ps), (10)
LU1(c)− λ[U1(c)− U0(c− Ps)] = 0, c ∈ (c+ Ps, b∗1), (11)
U1(c)− U1(b∗1) + b∗1 − c = 0, c ≥ b∗1, (12)
together with the boundary conditions U ′1(b∗1) = 1 and U ′′1 (b∗1) = 0.
The jump terms λ[U1(c)−u˜1(c)] and λ[U1(c)−U0(c−Ps)] on the left–hand sides of Equations (10)
and (11) reflect liquidation and a regime change after the run, respectively. Here, the value accruing
to the shareholders in the case of liquidation caused by a repo creditors’ run when c ∈ (c, c+Ps) is
given by u˜1(c) := max{ηA+ c− Pd − Pl − Ps, 0}, and the equity value U0 after a run that leads to
a regime change is as defined in Expression (7). As before, we require a verification result:
Proposition 2. For a given debt structure (Ps, Pl, Pd) and the interest rate on long–term debt rl, the
pre–run value of equity U1(c) satisfies System (10)–(12) with the boundary conditions U ′1(b∗1) = 1 and
U ′′1 (b∗1) = 0. The optimal, cumulative–dividend policy L∗ before the run acts on the liquid–reserves
process Cpi so as to keep it at or below the payout barrier b∗1 which is the unique solution to the
equation
U1(c; b
∗
1) = u˜1(c).
The closed–form solution to System (10) – (12) is cumbersome, so we relegate it to Appendix B.1.
However, the value of equity at the optimal payout barrier b∗1 can be easily pinned down by inserting
the boundary conditions U ′1(b∗1) = 1 and U ′′1 (b∗1) = 0 into Equation (11). This yields:
U1(b
∗
1) =
(1− θ)(µ− f1)
ρ+ λ
+
λ
ρ+ λ
U0(b
∗
1 − Ps),
where the first term reflects the value of perpetual continuation and the second one captures the
possibility of a regime switch in the event of a run.26
The pre–run value of debt. Let us now turn our attention to the value of the long–term, risky
debt. The long–term creditors anticipate the impact of the rollover risk on the bank’s optimal
liquidity–management policy. If a run takes place when the bank’s level of liquid reserves is c and
the bank survives, the long–term debt’s market value changes to D0(c−Ps), where D0 is as defined
in Expression (9). Alternatively, if the run by the repo creditors pushes the bank into liquidation,
the long–term creditors will collect the value d˜1(c), which depends on the relative seniority between
the risky debt and the insured deposits. Under these considerations, the market value of debt
26Note that the effective discount rate ρ+ λ is increasing with the probability of a run.
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satisfies the following system:
LD1(c) + rlPl − λ[D1(c)− d˜1(c)] = 0, c ∈ (c, c+ Ps),
LD1(c) + rlPl − λ[D1(c)−D0(c− Ps)] = 0, c ∈ (c+ Ps, b∗1).
We solve the above system with the corresponding boundary conditions in Appendix B.2, allowing
for the two possible scenarios of the respective seniority between the long–term debt and the insured
deposits.
The pre–run payout barrier and the interest rate on long–term debt. As a last step, we
determine, for a given debt structure (Ps, Pl, Pd), the equilibrium interest rate on long–term debt r∗l
and the optimal dividend barrier b∗1. From the first–order conditions of the problem of maximizing
the ex–ante value of the bank stated in Expression (3) we have the following result:
Lemma 1. The optimal initial level of liquid reserves satisfies c0 = b∗1.
In words, Lemma 1 establishes that the value–maximizing actions of the shareholders lead them
to start the bank with exactly the target level of liquid reserves. Although simple in essence, this
result is crucial, since will allow us to establish an explicit link between the optimal payout policy
and the financing structure.27 In other words, it is optimal to establish the bank with the maximum
level of liquid reserves so as to reduce the ex–ante likelihood of liquidation and, thereby, the long–
term debt’s cost. Therefore, for a given debt structure (Ps, Pl, Pd), the equilibrium interest rate
on long–term debt r∗l and the optimal dividend barrier b
∗
1 are jointly determined by the system of
equations28
D1(b
∗
1) = Pl and U1(c; b
∗
1) = u˜1(c). (13)
By establishing the aforementioned link between the optimal payout policy and the financing
structure, the above system is the vehicle via which the rollover risk pertaining to the repo financing
affects the optimal financing and payout decisions.
It is a priori not clear whether or not the pre–run payout barrier b∗1 exceeds the payout barrier
b∗0 that the shareholders would choose after the run of the repo creditors, should the bank survive
it. On the one hand, after a run the bank is no longer exposed to the rollover risk, which reduces
its precautionary motives for holding liquid reserves. This may suggest that it is optimal to reduce
27As it is, this property holds due to the absence of the proportional equity–issuance costs. If we allowed for equity
issuance with proportional deadweight costs, it would be optimal to establish the bank with an initial level of liquid
reserves c0 < b∗1.
28The caveat that the non–linear equation D1(b∗1) = Pl may have multiple roots is taken into account when we
search for numerical solutions in the next section. Unreported numerical results show that the value of the bank
evaluated at the payout barrier is decreasing over the range of admissible values of the interest rate. Thus, r∗l is
always given by the smallest root of D1(b∗1) = Pl.
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the target reserves level after the run. On the other hand, the bank becomes more profitable in
expectation, since it no longer has to make payments to the repo creditors. This generates a higher
franchise–value effect and may induce the bank to hold more liquid reserves. Which of these two
effects dominates will become apparent from the numerical analysis conducted in Section 4.
Applying the results of our analysis to the shareholders’ optimization Problem (3), one can easily
see that the latter reduces to the choice of the optimal financing structure:
max
(Ps,Pl)∈S(b∗1)
V ∗1 (Ps, Pl) =
{
U1(b
∗
1)− b∗1 − (A− Pl − Ps − Pd)
}
,
where S(b∗1) corresponds to the restriction of the strategy set S when the payout strategy is of
barrier type at the level b∗1.
In the sequel we solve the shareholders’ optimization problem numerically, using the following
parameter values: the discount rate ρ = 5%, the cost of insured deposits rd = {2.5%, 4.5%}, the
cost of repo funding rs = 2.5%, the expected return on risky assets µ = {20%, 25%, 30%}, the
volatility of the pre–tax earnings σ = 18%, the tax rate θ = 35%, the intensity of the repo–funding
withdrawal λ = {0.03, 0.05, 0.07}, the proportion of assets that can serve as collateral η = 0.3 and
the book asset value equal to the first–best value A ≡ (1− θ)µ/ρ.29
4. Model Analysis
In order to better understand what drives the bank’s choice between stable but costlier long–
term debt and unstable but relatively cheap repo funding, we first solve the shareholders’ problem
for a hypothetical bank that has no access to insured deposits. Next, we introduce deposit financing
and investigate the impact of the relative priority between the insured deposits and risky debt on
the bank’s liability structure.
4.1. No access to deposit funding
On the first stage of our numerical analysis, we disregard the possibility of deposit financing and
solve the shareholders’ problem for Pd = 0. To illustrate the impact of the repo funding, we also
evaluate the optimal financing and payout policies in the setting in which the bank has no access to
29The choice of parameters in our numerical exercise is partially motivated by empirical evidence and partially done
so as to preserve an interior solution to the problem of finding the optimal level of repo funding. In particular, the
value of rs is chosen close to the average for the 1–year LIBOR computed for the period 2000–2014. The value of η is
chosen close to the estimations of Gropp and Heider (2010), reporting that a bank’s collateral in average amounts to
27% of its assets. At the same time, the model turns out to be highly sensitive to the choice of the parameters λ and
σ. Namely, the bank has no incentives to use any repo funding when σ is relatively low and/or when λ is relatively
high.
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it (we refer to this setting as the benchmark).30 The optimal characteristics of the bank’s financing
and payout policies are reported in Table 2.
The first observation to be made in regard to the numerical results presented in Table 2 is that
the presence of repo funding in the bank’s liability structure impairs its ability to raise long–term
debt. However, the use of repo funding increases both the overall leverage and the ex–ante value
of the bank. Interestingly, banks with lower expected returns on risky assets benefit more from
the value–increasing effect generated by the presence of repo funding in their financing structure.
In particular, in our numerical example, the use of short–term, secured funding by the bank with
µ = 20% results in a 13% increase in the ex–ante value of the bank relative to the benchmark case,
whereas for the bank with µ = 30% the benefits of using repo funding are marginal and amount
only to a 2% increase in the ex–ante bank value (this comparison is made for λ = 0.03).
An important fact to be noted is that the amount of repo funding optimally chosen by the bank
in the absence of insured deposits is relatively low and the collateral constraint Ps ≤ ηA is far from
binding. Thus, contrary to the anecdotal and empirical evidence on banks’ over–reliance on repo
funding, our analysis shows that, when placed in the position of a non–financial firm, a bank would
be better off abstaining from an aggressive use of repo funding. This suggests that the increased
reliance on repo funding observed in practice might be partly rooted in the distortions induced by
the access to (insured) deposit funding (we explore this conjecture below).
The reason why our hypothetical bank has no incentives to aggressively rely on cheap repo
funding is that the use of this form of financing inflicts indirect costs on bank shareholders, which
we refer to as shadow costs. First, the additional source of default risk inherent in repo financing
increases the marginal value of liquid reserves within the bank and induces the shareholders to
target a higher level of liquid reserves. This feature is illustrated in Table 2 by the positive wedge
between the pre–run target level of liquid reserves b∗1 and the target level b∗0 that the bank would
set if it were to survive the run. This wedge can be seen as a precautionary liquidity buffer needed
to protect the bank against the rollover risk related to the use of repo funding.31
Yet, targeting very high levels of liquid reserves to offset the additional default risk brought about
by the use of repo funding is costly (recall that liquid reserves are non-remunerated). As a result, the
interest that long- term debt holders earn carries an extra premium as compensation for the negative
externalities imposed on them by the bank’s decision to use repos as a complementary source of
funding. Thus, the use of cheap repo funding magnifies the cost of long–term debt funding.32 This
30The values of equity and debt in this setting correspond to the functions U0 and D0 defined in Section 3.1,
whereas the optimal payout barrier and the interest rate on long–term debt result from jointly solving the equations
D0(b
∗
0) = Pl and U0(b∗0) = 0.
31This finding resonates with the empirical evidence documented by Harford et al. (2014) for non–financial firms;
namely, that firms tend to strengthen their liquid reserves in order to manage their refinancing risk better.
32A similar result is obtained by Auh and Sundaresan (2014) in a Leland–type structural model that allows for
endogenous rollover risk.
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effect is illustrated on the left–hand side panel of Figure 1, which reports the difference between the
equilibrium interest rate on long–term debt obtained in the setting in which the bank has access to
repo funding and the equilibrium interest rate obtained in the benchmark case:
r∗l (Ps, Pl)− r∗l (Pl). (14)
The above difference will be further referred to as the extra premium related to the presence of
repos in the bank’s financing structure. Overall, it is this potential increase in the cost of long–term
debt funding combined with the cost of maintaining an extra cushion of liquid reserves what curbs
the banks’ appetite for “cheap” repo funding.
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Figure 1: The impact of repos on the cost of long-term debt and payout policy
Notes: This figure illustrates the extra–premium component in the long–term debt spreads related to the use of repos (the
left–hand side panel, in bps) and the scale of the upward adjustments in the target levels of liquid reserves measured relative
to the benchmark levels (the right–hand side panel, in %) for two levels of the expected return µ on risky assets. For this
numerical example we have taken Ps = 0.25 and λ = 0.03.
Note that the difference in the magnitude of the extra premium inflicted by the use of repos for
banks with different levels of expected returns on risky assets µ can be easily understood by taking
into account the effect of µ on the optimal payout policy. This effect is illustrated in the right–hand
panel of Figure 1, which depicts the upward adjustments that a bank would make to its target level
of liquid reserves relative to the levels it would set when making no use of repos. These adjustments
are computed according to the following formula:
b∗1(Ps, Pl)− b∗0(Pl)
b∗0(Pl)
× 100%. (15)
It turns out that, for the same debt structure (Ps, Pl), a bank enjoying a higher expected return
on risky assets would be able to make a larger upward adjustment of its target level of liquid reserves,
thereby being able to offset a larger fraction of the additional liquidation risk related to the use of
repo funding. As a result, the interest rate on long–term debt issued by the banks with higher µ’s
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exhibits a lower extra premium related to the use of repos.
Result 1. The use of repos generates an additional component in the spreads of the long–term risky
debt, which decreases with the bank expected returns on risky assets.
The comparative statics results reported in Table 2 suggest that expected returns on risky assets
are an important driver of the debt–structure choice. In particular, a bank with a lower return on
assets µ exhibits a higher ratio of repo funding to total debt. There are two main effects behind this
result. First, there is a direct franchise–value effect implying that the shareholders of a bank with a
higher expected return on risky assets are more averse to the risk of liquidation than shareholders of
a bank with a lower expected return, which induces them to use lower amounts of repos.33 Second,
there is an indirect effect of µ working via the channel of interaction between the optimal liquidity
management and the financing costs. It stems from the fact that banks with lower µ face a higher
wedge between the costs of repos and long–term debt financing. Indeed, lower expected returns
imply higher liquidation risks (because of a lower speed of accumulation of earnings after a series of
negative shocks) and, thus, higher costs of long–term debt financing. This initial cost disadvantage
of the long–term debt for the banks with lower µ’s is reinforced by the shadow–costs effect. As
it was pointed out above, lower expected returns on risky assets undermine the bank’s ability to
maintain strong liquidity buffers to hedge against the rollover risk inflicted by repos. The higher
extra premium that the banks with lower µ’s have to pay when raising the same amount of long–
term debt as the banks with higher µ’s exacerbates the relative cost disadvantage of long–term debt
even further, which pushes the banks with lower µ’s to rely more on repo funding.
Result 2. Repo funding plays a more prominent role in the financing structure of banks with lower
returns on their risky assets.
The final remark to be made with respect to numerical results reported in Table 2 is that both
the interest rate on long–term debt and the target level of liquid reserves that the bank will fix prior
to the run are decreasing in the intensity λ of the repo creditors’ runs. This counterintuitive result
is due to the fact that, when estimating the rollover risk to be low, the bank would be tempted
to use a larger volume of repo funding. This would require setting a higher target level of liquid
reserves in order to alleviate the consequent increase in the liquidation risk.34 Yet, a larger volume
of repo funding also reduces the expected residual value accruing to the long–term debt creditors
in the case of a liquidation. This adverse effect of repo financing cannot be completely offset via
an adjustment of the optimal payout policy (since maintaining high liquidity buffers is costly) and
33We observe this result in an unreported scenario of our numerical analysis, where we abstract from the possibility
of issuing long–term risky debt and consider the optimal choice of the amount of repos for different levels of µ.
34The adjustment of the target level of liquid reserves, actually, explains why the quantitative effect of the run
intensity on the cost of long–term debt is marginal.
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will translate into higher costs of long–term debt. This positive relation between the long–term
debt’s cost and the relative importance of repos that emerged from our numerical analysis echoes
the empirical evidence documented by Valenzuela (2013) and Gopalan et al. (2013) for non–financial
firms.
4.2. Deposit funding and the depositor preference rule
Having considered the optimal financing and payout decisions of a bank without access to insured
deposits, we now explore how the access to deposit funding affects the choice of the non–deposit
sources of funding. We distinguish between two scenarios of priority rules. In the first scenario,
deposits are junior to long–term debt. The second scenario mirrors the U.S. depositor preference
law introduced on a national level in 1993, according to which domestic deposits are senior to all
other debt claims.35
We solve the shareholders’ optimization problem for the volume of insured deposits Pd = 2,
which accounts for 50− 75% of total assets in our numerical example (conditional on the values of
µ in the different scenarios), and report the results in Table 3. A comparison of the bank’s optimal
financing and payout decisions with those obtained in the setting with no deposit funding reveals
two interesting observations.
First, it turns out that the access to deposit funding increases the relative importance of repos,
which is reflected in the ratios P ∗s /(P ∗s +P ∗l ) and P
∗
s /(A+ b
∗
1). To gain intuition on this result, note
that, when the bank (for some reason not modeled here) gives priority to deposit funding and then
decides on the complementary sources of funding, the interest rate paid on deposits only affects
the effective rate of return on risky assets. In other words, the qualitative effect of the access to
deposit funding is equivalent to the effect of lowering µ, which was discussed in Section 4.1. Indeed,
as shown in Table 3, banks with access to deposits funding tend to increase their reliance on repo
funding.36
Second, making insured deposits senior to long–term debt renders the banks even more reliant
on repo funding. The reason is that the depositor preference rule reduces the amount accruing to
the long–term creditors in the case of liquidation, which translates into higher costs of long–term
debt and, thus, exacerbates the relative cost advantage of repo funding.
Result 3. The access to deposit funding and the depositor seniority rule exacerbate the bank’s re-
liance on repo funding.
Notice, however, that the quantitative impacts of deposit funding and deposit seniority rules
on the optimal volume of repo funding remain relatively modest for most combinations of input
35The introduction of a similar law for European countries is currently being considered by the European authorities.
36To show that this result is not driven by the difference in the cost of repos and deposits, in Table 3 we report
the bank’s financing and payout policies for the particular case when the interest rates on insured deposits and repos
coincide, i.e. rd = rs = 2.5%.
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parameters. In other words, claiming that the access to deposit funding is the only major factor that
pushes a bank to aggressively substitute long–term debt by repo funding would be inappropriate.
The reason being that the incentives to increase the reliance on repo funding are still mitigated by
the potential shadow costs.
5. The Impact of Regulation
So far, our analysis has been focused on the management decisions of an unregulated bank. In
reality, however, banks face regulatory requirements. In this section, we try to understand how
various regulatory measures affect the bank’s financing structure and, in particular, the relative
importance of repos among its liabilities.
5.1. Liquidity regulation
We start by exploring the effect of liquidity regulation on the optimal payout and financing
policies of the bank. Given that the (over)reliance of banks on repo funding is commonly recognized
as a threat to financial instability, one of the objectives of the new liquidity regulation introduced
in Basel III is to reduce the use of repo funding by banks (see e.g., IMF Global Financial Stability
Report (2013), Chapter 3). We introduce liquidity regulation in the spirit of the Basel III Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR). This regulatory measure stipulates that banks must maintain a level of
highly–liquid assets in a certain proportion to the volume of fund withdrawals expected in the next
30 days. In our setting, this idea is captured in simple fashion by assuming that the level of the
bank’s liquid reserves must always exceed a certain fraction of its repo funding. Hence, liquidity
regulation in our model establishes a link between the volume of repo funding and the liquidation
threshold:37
c∗(Λ) = ΛPs,
where Λ ≥ 0 is a regulatory parameter reflecting the tightness of the liquidity requirements.
When solving their optimization problem under such a regulatory constraint, the bank’s share-
holders must take into account the feedback effect that their choice of Ps will have on the liquidation
and payout policies. Intuitively, one would expect that tighter liquidity requirements should curb
the bank’s appetite for repo funding and should reduce its exposure to the run–triggered liquidation
risk. To verify this conjecture, we turn to a numerical analysis.
The left–hand panel of Figure 2 depicts the proportions of repos and long–term debt in the bank’s
total financing structure as functions of Λ. Indeed, when faced with tighter liquidity requirements,
the bank reduces its reliance on repo funding and can even be completely discouraged from its use.
Simultaneously, the bank increases its reliance on long–term debt funding. In other words, imposing
37A similar approach to modeling liquidity requirements is taken by Adrian and Boyarchenko (2013).
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Figure 2: Liquidity requirements and bank policies
Notes: The left–hand side panel depicts the proportions of repos and long–term debt in the overall financing structure. Param-
eter values: Pd = 2, ρ = 5%, rd = 4.5%, rs = 2.5%, µ = 20%, σ = 18%, θ = 35%, η = 0.3 and λ = 0.05. Deposits are senior to
long–term risky debt. In this example, the bank makes no use of repo funding for Λ > 0.18. The right–hand side panel reports
the optimal payout barrier b∗1 (the solid line) and the magnitude of the target liquidity buffers b
∗
1 − c (the dashed line).
tighter liquidity regulation leads to substitution of repos by long–term debt funding, provided that
the volume of insured deposits is fixed.
To understand the underlying mechanism at work, notice that, given any fixed Ps, the presence
of liquidity requirements translates into a strictly positive liquidation threshold; hence, it increases
the risk of liquidation. In principle, the bank could offset this adverse effect by making an upward
adjustment of its target level of liquid reserves. Yet, due to the deadweight cost of holding liquidity,
the bank would prefer to reduce its reliance on repos rather than to substantially strengthen its
liquidity buffer. The reduction in the level of repo funding reduces the cost of long–term debt
(via the extra–premium component), which eventually enables the bank to increase its reliance on
long–term debt.
Result 4. Tightening the liquidity requirements induces a substitution of repo funding by long–term
debt funding.
Given that tightening liquidity requirements generates a substitution effect, it is worthwhile to
consider the impact of liquidity requirements on the bank’s liquidation probability. In Appendix C
we describe how we compute the latter, allowing for the possibility of a run by the repo creditors.
We apply this methodology to evaluate the relative change in the liquidation probability caused by
the implementation of liquidity regulation, which is computed according to the following formula:
∆p(T, c; Λ) =
p(T, c; Λ)− p(T, c; 0)
p(T, c; 0)
,
where p(T, c; Λ) is the probability of liquidation over a period of length T when the current level of
liquid reserves is c and the regulatory level is Λ (see Appendix C).
We set T = 1 (1 year) and compute the relative changes in the liquidation probability evaluated
at the target level of liquid reserves, i.e. ∆p(T, b∗1(Λ); Λ). The numerical results reported in Figure 3
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show that tighter liquidity regulation, in fact, reduces the liquidation probability despite the debt
substitution effect discussed above. Moreover, this effect turns out to be more pronounced for those
banks that have lower returns on risky assets.
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Figure 3: Relative changes in the bank’s liquidation probability
Notes: This figure depicts the relative changes in the liquidation probability computed at the target level of liquid reserves for
a 1–year time horizon. Parameter values: Pd = 2, ρ = 5%, rd = 4.5%, rs = 2.5%, σ = 18%, θ = 35%, η = 0.3 and λ = 0.05.
Deposits are senior to long–term debt.
5.2. Payout restrictions
One more novel feature of the Basel III regulation was the introduction of payout restrictions
on insufficiently capitalized banks.38 A question of interest is how these payout restrictions affect
the banks’ ex–ante choices of financing structure and, in particular, the relative importance of repo
financing. To explore this question, we study below the case where the bank’s shareholders are
prohibited from distributing dividends when the book value of bank equity falls below a certain
critical level kdiv, i.e. when
A+ Cpi(t)− (Ps1{t≤τ∗} + Pl + Pd)
A+ Cpi(t)
< kdiv. (16)
For a given liability structure (Ps, Pl, Pd), Condition (16) can be rewritten in terms of a critical
level of liquid reserves below which dividend distribution is forbidden. Specifically, the regulatory
payout threshold before the run is given by
breg1 (Ps, Pl, Pd) = max
{Ps + Pl + Pd
1− kdiv −A, 0
}
, (17)
whereas the regulatory payout threshold after the run is
38Specifically, payout restrictions apply to the banks that fail to meet the capital conservation buffer requirement
(the requirement to maintain 2.5% of common Tier equity capital on top of the minimum capital requirements).
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Figure 4: The impact of payout restrictions on the marginal value of c
breg0 (Pl, Pd) = max
{Pl + Pd
1− kdiv −A, 0
}
. (18)
To understand how the payout restrictions affect a bank’s financing policy, let us fix an arbitrary
volume Ps of repos and consider the shareholders’ optimization problem, which now consists of
choosing the initial level of liquid reserves c0, the volume of long–term debt Pl and the optimal
payout policy characterized by the pair of payout thresholds (b0, b1).
The presence of the payout restrictions (breg0 , b
reg
1 )
39 has no impact on the bank’s payout policy
and its choice of the initial level of liquid reserves if and only if breg1 < b
∗
1 and b
reg
0 < b
∗
0. In all
the alternative cases the bank’s payout policy will be affected by regulation. The situation when
breg0 > b
∗
0 affects the ex–ante value of the bank’s securities and, thus, the choice of the pre–run
payout barrier b∗1, which will not coincide with the unconstrained, pre–run target level of liquid
reserves. Regardless of whether the post–run regulation is binding or not, if breg1 > b
∗
1, the bank is
forced to abstain from distributing dividends when its liquid reserves are below breg1 . This reduces
the value of the shareholders’ equity and affects the marginal value of liquid reserves. Recall that,
without payout restrictions, the latter was monotonically decreasing in the level of c, i.e. U ′′1 (c) < 0
over (0, b1), and U ′′1 (b1) = 0. This is, however, no longer the case when the payout barrier is set to
breg1 > b
∗
1. In Figure 4 we plot the typical patterns of the marginal value of liquid reserves U ′1 and
its first derivative in the neighborhood of mandatory payout barrier breg1 > b
∗
1. This shows that, in
a neighborhood of breg1 , the equity value U1 becomes locally convex and there exists a certain level
of liquid reserves c∗0 < b
reg
1 , such that U
′
1(c
∗
0) = 1 and U ′′1 (c∗0) < 0.
It is easy to see from the shareholder maximization Problem (3) that, for a fixed liability struc-
ture, the value c∗0 determined via the relation U ′1(c∗0) = 1 represents the optimal level of liquid
reserves at which shareholders will choose to initiate the bank. As we have seen in Section 3, in the
39For the sake of space we omit arguments of breg1 , b
reg
0 , b
∗
1, b∗0 in the text.
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absence of payout restrictions, c∗0 coincides with the target level of liquid reserves b∗1. However, the
payout restrictions reduce the expected value of dividends; hence, shareholders make lower initial
equity contributions compared to the unregulated case, i.e. c∗0 < b∗1. A discussion on the mechanism
at work can be found in Appendix B.3.
Result 5. When breg1 > b
∗
1, the shareholders choose to initiate the bank at a level of liquid reserves
c∗0 < b∗1.
Consider now the impact of payout restrictions on the long–term debt’s cost, which is determined
by the condition D1(c∗0) = Pl. The presence of the payout restrictions generates two counteracting
effects. On the one hand, a lower initial capitalization (as compared to the unregulated case)
increases the bank’s liquidation probability for short time horizons, which in turn reduces the
market value of debt. On the other hand, the probability of liquidation for long time horizons
decreases, since the bank will be forced to maintain a larger liquidity buffer. Numerical simulations
show that the latter effect dominates when the face value of the long–term debt is not too high. In
such a case, for a given level of Ps, the bank will choose a higher level of long–term debt than in
the unregulated case, which will in turn increase its ex–ante value.
Even though the value–increasing effect generated by the payout restrictions may seem coun-
terintuitive at a first glance, it admits a very natural explanation. In fact, in the absence of the
payout restrictions, shareholders do worse due to a commitment problem. Indeed, even though de-
laying dividend payments, i.e. setting a higher payout threshold, may be optimal from an ex–ante
perspective because it reduces the cost of debt financing, thus increasing the bank’s value, once
the long–term debt is issued, the shareholders will have incentives to switch to the payout policy
that maximizes their dividend payoffs and implies a higher liquidation risk. Rational creditors will
anticipate this behavior and will demand a higher interest rate on their debt. In contrast, the
payout restrictions imposed by the regulator work as a credible commitment mechanism that helps
the bank reduce its cost of long–term debt financing.
The reduction in the cost of long–term debt financing generated by the commitment effect
brought about by the implementation of payout restrictions in turn reduces the cost advantage
of repos, thereby inducing the bank to substitute repo funding by long–term debt one. Table 4
illustrates the effects of the payout restrictions on the bank’s financing and payout policies: one can
observe that the implementation of payout restrictions reduces both the proportion of repos and
the cost of long–term debt due to the aforementioned commitment effect.
5.3. Capital regulation
Finally, we turn to the analysis of the effect of capital regulation on the ex–ante choice of the
bank’s optimal strategies. Capital regulation in our model takes the form of restrictions on the
(book) leverage ratio:
A+ Cpi(t)− (Ps1{t≤τ∗} + Pl + Pd)
A+ Cpi(t)
≥ klev.
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Table 4: The impact of payout restrictions on bank policies
kdiv P
∗
s P
∗
l c
∗
0 b1 b0 rl MLev BLev V ∗1
P∗s
A+b∗1
– 0.229 0.524 0.5246 0.5246 0.4882 6.36% 0.76 0.88 0.50 7.33%
0.13 0.214 0.590 0.4339 0.6230 0.4872 5.94% 0.79 0.87 0.53 6.64%
µ = 20% 0.15 0.200 0.539 0.4396 0.6224 0.4891 5.81% 0.77 0.85 0.52 6.21%
0.17 0.187 0.484 0.4441 0.6181 0.4901 5.71% 0.75 0.83 0.51 5.81%
0.19 0.177 0.423 0.4498 0.6099 0.4904 5.63% 0.73 0.81 0.49 5.51%
– 0.183 1.167 0.5247 0.5247 0.4895 5.79% 0.75 0.89 0.68 4.85%
0.13 0.173 1.200 0.4435 0.6270 0.4889 5.47% 0.76 0.87 0.72 4.46%
µ = 25% 0.15 0.163 1.126 0.4432 0.6194 0.4870 5.41% 0.75 0.85 0.70 4.21%
0.17 0.153 1.048 0.4441 0.6066 0.4846 5.37% 0.73 0.83 0.69 3.97%
0.19 0.145 0.971 0.4432 0.5969 0.4817 5.33% 0.71 0.81 0.67 3.77%
Notes: This table illustrates the impact of payout restrictions on the bank’s strategies. The columns MLev and BLev
report the market and book leverages computed at the target level of liquid reserves b∗1. The first line in each panel
corresponds to the unregulated set–up. Parameter values: ρ = 5%, rd = 4.5%, r = 2.5%, λ = 0.03, σ = 18%, θ = 35%,
Pd = 2 and η = 0.3. Deposits are senior to long-term risky debt. Note that, when kdiv increases, the bank reduces
leverage so as to avoid targeting a very high level of liquidity reserves. The reduction in leverage in turn drives down the
ex–ante equity value V ∗1 .
The above constraint can be rewritten in terms of a level of liquid reserves at which the bank
will be subject to mandatory liquidation:40
Cpi(t) ≥ max
{Ps1{t≤τ∗} + Pl + Pd
1− klev −A, 0
}
=: c(klev). (19)
Again, we solve the shareholders’ problem numerically by taking into account the regulatory
Constraint (19). The results of our numerical analysis, reported in Table 5, show that tighter
capital requirements induce the bank to target a lower leverage ratio by making cuts on both repos
and long–term debt. This suggests that introducing special liquidity requirements to curb the
bank’s reliance on repos might be redundant, since the desired effect can be achieved via capital
requirements alone.
It is also worthwhile to notice that, when faced with a tighter leverage ratio, a bank will adjust
its financing structure so as to avoid regulatory liquidation at a strictly positive level of liquid
reserves, i.e. c(klev) = 0 for any level of klev. Under the assumption that hoarding liquidity entails
deadweight costs, this result is very robust to changes in the parameters. In fact, any change in
the level of debt that would raise the bank’s liquidation threshold from zero to a strictly positive
level, would induce the bank to increase its target level of liquid reserves by the same amount (see
e.g., Hugonnier and Morellec (2015)). As long as the marginal cost of increasing the liquid reserves
40Notice that, before the run, the bank faces a higher liquidation threshold.
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Table 5: The impact of leverage regulation on bank policies
klev Ps Pl c(klev) b1 b0 rl MLev BLev V ∗1
P∗s
A+b∗1
– 0.229 0.524 0 0.5246 0.4882 6.29% 0.76 0.88 0.50 7.33%
0.05 0.069 0.401 0 0.5014 0.4904 5.82% 0.69 0.80 0.46 2.22%
µ = 20% 0.10 0.049 0.291 0 0.4968 0.4892 5.67% 0.66 0.76 0.43 1.58%
0.15 0.035 0.175 0 0.4917 0.4865 5.56% 0.63 0.71 0.40 1.13%
0.20 0.025 0.055 0 0.4862 0.4826 5.48% 0.60 0.67 0.37 0.81%
– 0.183 1.167 0 0.5247 0.4895 5.77% 0.75 0.89 0.68 4.85%
0.05 0.060 1.027 0 0.4957 0.4849 5.54% 0.70 0.82 0.65 1.60%
µ = 25% 0.10 0.041 0.884 0 0.4859 0.4792 5.44% 0.67 0.78 0.62 1.10%
0.15 0.029 0.733 0 0.4768 0.4723 5.36% 0.64 0.74 0.59 0.78%
0.20 0.021 0.579 0 0.4679 0.4648 5.31% 0.61 0.70 0.55 0.56%
Notes: This table illustrates the impact of leverage regulation on the bank’s policies. The columns MLev and BLev
report the market and book leverages computed at the target level of liquid reserves b∗1. The first line in each panel
corresponds to the unregulated set-up.Parameter values: ρ = 5%, rd = 4.5%, r = 2.5%, λ = 0.03, σ = 18%, θ = 35%,
Pd = 2 and η = 0.3.
exceeds the forgone tax benefits resulting from a reduction of debt, the bank prefers to reduce its
levels of debt so as to avoid being liquidated at a strictly positive level of liquid reserves. This is in
fact the channel through which capital regulation curbs the bank’s appetite for a higher leverage in
our setting. In other words, the interplay between the liquidation and the payout policies works as
a transmission channel of the disciplining effect of capital regulation.
6. Conclusions
We have developed a continuous–time structural model of banking to understand what drives a
bank’s financing choices between repos, which carry with them rollover risk, and risky, long–term
debt, which is a stable source of funding. The crucial feature of the model is that the bank’s liquid
reserves serve as a buffer against the losses caused by a run of the repo creditors. As a result, the
bank’s ability to build larger liquid reserves has direct implications on its choices of debt structure.
We have shown that the bank internalizes the rollover risk inherent in the use of repos via (i)
an additional component in long–term debt spreads and (ii) the deadweight costs of maintaining an
extra cushion of liquid reserves needed to mitigate the increase in the default risk. Taken together,
these indirect ("shadow") costs prevent the bank from relying too heavily on cheap repo funding.
Our analysis also shows that banks with higher returns on risky assets exhibit a lower proportion
of repos in their financing structure. In contrast, banks with lower returns on risky assets are
more reliant on repos. This model prediction is backed by two effects. First, there is a direct
franchise–value effect in line with the standard risk–taking arguments, which induces banks with
lower expected return on risky assets to take a higher tail risk on the liability side of its balance
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sheet. Second, there is a more subtle effect stemming from the fact that banks with lower returns on
risky assets cannot afford to hold substantial amounts of liquid reserves and, as a consequence, face
higher costs of long–term debt, which push them to substitute long–term debt financing with repos.
Allowing banks to have access to insured deposits leads to the qualitatively similar implication: a
large volume of insured deposit in the bank’s financing structure reduces its effective earnings and
weakens its capacity to maintain high levels of liquid reserves, thereby inducing the bank to increase
its reliance on repos. Moreover, this effect becomes even more pronounced when insured deposits
are senior to long–term debt.
We also examine the effect of regulation on a bank’s ex–ante choice of financing structure,
by considering three regulatory tools: liquidity regulation in the spirit of the Basel III Liquidity
Coverage Ratio, payout restrictions and a capital ratio. All in all, we find that all of these tools
are capable of curbing the bank’s appetite for repos. Under liquidity regulation, which requires the
bank to maintain a minimum level of liquid reserves as a certain proportion of its volume of repos,
the bank substitutes short–term debt funding by long–term debt one. Payout restrictions induce a
similar substitution effect, as the bank operates with higher target levels of liquid reserves and, thus,
faces a lower liquidation risk. Capital regulation, however, induces the bank to lower the volumes of
both repos and long–term debt, which suggests that developing special liquidity regulation in order
to reduce the banks’ reliance on repos might be redundant.
It should be acknowledged that our model’s versatility, which allowed us to consider debt of
different maturities and seniorities, together with insured deposits, does have as a downside: a
large part of our analysis has to be done numerically. Whenever possible, we have provided the
mathematical reasoning behind the model’s features but, unfortunately, this could not be done in all
situations. A clear avenue for future research would be the development of a fully dynamic structure
of a bank’s balance sheet, which is only partially the case in the current work. A related line of
inquiry would be to address how bank liability and asset structures adjust following the changes in
the liquidation value of risky assets caused by changes in macroeconomic conditions.
7. Appendix
Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorems 1 - 2
In order to ease the exposition we mostly work with the generic function Ui, i = 0, 1, since both
proofs share most of the methodology. Whenever required, we indicate where is it that the cases
i = 0 and i = 1 diverge. Given that the proofs are quite long, we have chosen to label each step
separately. We first show how the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations for the functions U0 and
U1, respectively introduced in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, are obtained. We assume these functions to be
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twice continuously differentiable. We also prove that the mapping c 7→ Ui(c) is concave. In order
to simplify the exposition we use the following notation:
f0 := rdPd + rlPl, f1 := rdPd + rlPl + rsPs,
dCL0 (t) := (1− θ)(µ− f0)dt+ (1− θ)σdW (t)− dL(t)
and
dCL1 (t) := (1− θ)(µ− f1)dt+ (1− θ)σdW (t)− dL(t)− 1{t≤τ∗}PsdN(t).
Expressing U1(c) using the dynamic–programming principle. We present below the ex-
panded representation of U1(c). To this end, recall that u˜1(c) represents the value accruing to
shareholders in the case that liquidation occurs before or due to the run, whereas u˜0(c) is the
shareholders’ liquidation value when the default event is posterior to the repo run. We then have,
following the dynamic–programming principle, that
U1(c) = sup
L
E0
[ ∫ τpi∧τ∗
0
e−ρtdL(t) + e−ρτpi1{τpi<τ∗}u˜1
(
c
)
+ e−ρτ
∗[
1{τ∗=τpi}u˜1
(
CL1 (τ
∗)
)
+ 1{τ∗<τpi}U0
(
CL1 (τ
∗)− Ps
)]]
,
where
U0(c) = sup
L
E0
[ ∫ τpi
0
dL(t) + e−ρτpi u˜0(CL0 (τpi))
]
is the post–run equity value function. Observe that the term e−ρτpi1{τpi<τ∗}u˜
(
c
)
corresponds to
the case where liquidation is caused by a gradual depletion of the bank’s liquid reserves (via
the Brownian risk) before a run by the repo creditors takes place, i.e. CL1 (τpi) = c. The term
e−ρτ∗1{τ∗=τpi}u˜1
(
CL1 (τ
∗)
)
is the present value of what accrues to the shareholders if the repo run
results in liquidation. In this case c ≤ CL1 (τ∗) ≤ c + Ps. Finally, e−ρτ
∗
1{τ∗<τpi}U0
(
CL1 (τ
∗) − Ps
)
is
the discounted, post–run equity value should the bank survive the sudden withdrawal of funds by
the repo creditors, which occurs if and only if CL1 (τ∗) > c+ Ps.
Concavity. Consider the reserves levels c1, c2 > c and let L1 and L2 be two corresponding admis-
sible payout policies. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and define
c˜ := λc1 + (1− λ)c2 and L˜ := λL1 + (1− λ)L2.
Clearly L˜ is admissible. Since dCL˜i = λdC
L1
i + (1 − λ)dCL2i and the conditional–expectation
operator is linear, we have
Ui(c˜) ≥ U L˜i (c˜) = λUL1i (c1) + (1− λ)UL2i (c2).
By definition, for all  > 0 the strategy L1 can be chosen such that UL1i (c1) ≥ Ui(c1)− /2, and
analogously for Ui(c2). In other words, the expression
Ui(c˜) ≥ λUi(c1) + (1− λ)Ui(c2)− 
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holds for any positive ; thus, the mapping c 7→ Ui(c) is concave.
Complementarity conditions. Next we consider the condition 1 ≤ U ′i . By definition, for any
h, y > c there exists a strategy Ly such that U
Ly
i (y) ≥ Ui(y) − h2. Let c < h < c and construct a
strategy L by setting L(t) = h+ Lc−h(t), Then
Ui(c) ≥ ULi (c) = h+ ULc−hi (c− h) ≥ h+ Ui(c− h)− h2,
which is equivalent to
Ui(c)− Ui(c− h)
h
≥ 1− h.
By the differentiability of Ui, we may let h go to zero and conclude that U ′i(c) ≥ 1 for all c ≥ c.
Differential characterizations. Below we show that for c > c it holds that
L0U0(c) := LU0(c)− (1− θ)rsPsU ′0(c) ≤ 0
and
L1U1(c) := LU1(c)− λ
[
U1(c)− U0
(
(c− Ps)+
)] ≤ 0,
where the operator L : C2 → C is defined as
Lg := (1− θ)2σ
2
2
g′′ + (1− θ)(µ− f1)g′ − ρg.
To this end, we fix a payout policy L with corresponding liquid–reserves process CLi (C
L
i (0) = c)
and apply Itô’s formula to gi(t, c) := e−ρtUi(c) :
e−ρtUi
(
CLi (t)
)
= Ui(c) +
∫ t
0
e−ρs
[
(1− θ)(µ− fi)U ′i
(
CLi (s)
)− ρUi(CLi (s))]ds
+
1
2
∫ t
0
e−ρsU ′′i (C
L
s )d[C
L
i , C
L
i ]
c(s)
+
∫ t
0
e−ρs(1− θ)σU ′i(CLi (s))dW (s)−
∫ t
0
e−ρsU ′i(C
L
i (s))dL(s)
+
∑
s∈Γi
e−ρs
[
Ui(C
L
i (s+))− Ui(CLi (s))− U ′i(CLi (s))
(
CLi (s+)− CLi (s)
)]
,
(A1)
where Γ1 is the set of discontinuities of L and Γ2 is the set of discontinuities of 1{t≤τ∗}PsN. Since
L and 1{t≤τ∗}PsN are of bounded variation, we have that
d[CLi , C
L
i ]
c(s) = (1− θ)2σ2ds.
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Thus, Equation (A1) becomes
e−ρtUi(CLi (t)) = Ui(c) +
∫ t
0
e−ρsLUi(CLi (s))ds
+
∫ t
0
e−ρs(1− θ)σU ′i(CLi (s))dW (s)−
∫ t
0
e−ρsU ′i(C
L
i (s))dL(s)
+
∑
s∈Γ
e−ρs
[
Ui(C
L
i (s+))− Ui(CLi (s))− U ′i(CLi (s))
(
CLi (s+)− CLi (s)
)]
,
(A2)
If we take expectations on both sides of Equation (A2), the Itô integral vanishes and, using the
Dynamic Programming Principle, we obtain
E
[
e−ρtUi(CLi (t))
]
≤ Ui(c)− E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsU ′i(C
L
i (s))dL(s)
]
. (A3)
Notice that for the Poisson jump we have∑
0≤s≤t
E
[
e−ρs
(
U1(C
L
1 (s+))− U1(CL1 (s))
)]
= −λ
∫ t
0
e−ρs
[
U1(C
L
1 (s))− U0(CL1 (s)− Ps)
]
ds. (A4)
Expressions (A3) and (A4) yield
0 ≥ E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsLiUi(CLs )ds
]
+ E
[∑
s∈Γ
e−ρs
(
Ui(C
L
i (s+))− Ui(CLi (s))− U ′i(CLi (s))(CLi (s+)− CLi (s))
)]
, (A5)
where Γ is the set of discontinuities of L. By the Mean Value Theorem, there exists cˆ ∈ (CLi (s+), CLi (s))
such that
Ui(C
L
i (s+))− Ui(CLi (s)) = U ′i(cˆ)
[
CLi (s+)− CLi (s)
]
.
Therefore
Ui(C
L
i (s+))− Ui(CLi (s))− U ′i(CLi (s))
[
CLi (s+)− CLi (s)
]
=
[
U ′i(cˆ)− U ′i(CLi (s))
][
CLi (s+)− CLi (s)
]
and, by concavity of Ui, the right–hand side of the above expression, as well as the second term on
the right–hand side of Expression (A5) are positive. This yields
0 ≥ E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsLiUi(CLi (s))ds
]
. (A6)
Next we multiply both sides of the equation above times 1/t. Since
1
t
∫ t
0
e−ρsLiUi(CLs )ds ≤ max
s∈[0,t]
e−ρs
∣∣LiUi(CLs )∣∣ <∞,
we may apply Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem and take the limit as t→ 0 inside the
expectation operator, which yields
LiUi(c) ≤ 0.
Variational inequalities. So far, we have shown that Ui satisfies, for c > c, the set of variational
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inequalities
LiUi(c) ≤ 0 and 1− U ′i(c) ≤ 0.
Our next task is to prove that one of the inequalities is always tight. In order to do so, we resort
to the Dynamic Programming Principle and write, for t > 0,
Ui(c) = max
L∈S
E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsdLs + e−ρtUi(CLi (t))
]
.
Inserting Equation (A2) into the equation above we obtain
0 = sup
L∈S
{
E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsLiUi(CLi (s))ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρs
(
1− U ′i(CLi (s))
)
dL(s)
]
+ E
[∑
s∈Γ
e−ρs
(
∆Ui(C
L
i (s))− U ′i(CLi (s))∆CLi (s)
)]}
.
(A7)
If we write L˜ for the continuous pars of L, then Equation (A7) may be rewritten as
0 = sup
pi∈Πp
{
E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsLiUi(CLi (s))ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρs
(
1− U ′i(CLi (s))
)
dL˜(s)
]
+ E
[∑
s∈Γ
e−ρs
(
∆Ui(C
L
i (s)) + ∆L(s)
)]}
.
Notice that for all s ∈ (0, t)⋂Γ it holds that
∆Ui(C
L
i (s)) + ∆L(s) =
∫ CLi (s)
CLi (s)−∆L(s)
(
1− U ′i(c)
)
dc ≤ 0.
This implies all summands on the right–hand side of Equation (A7) are non positive; thus, for
c > c it holds that
max
{
LiUi(c), 1− U ′i(c)
}
= 0.
Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Propositions 1 - 2
The functions U0 and U1, characterized by Equation (7) and System (10) - (12), respectively
are only candidates for the value functions discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The proof of the
propositions requires us to verify that these candidates indeed correspond to the solutions of the
manager’s optimizing actions. To this end, on a first step we assume there exist equilibrium r∗l ,
b∗0 and b∗1 such that U0(0; b∗0) = 0, D1(b∗1) = Pl and U1(0; b∗1) = 0 and prove the results concerning
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optimality of the payout policies and of Ui(·; b∗i ), for i = 0, 1. On a second step, we show that for
rl, Pl ≥ 0 given, the equation
U0(0; b
∗
0(rl, Pl)) = 0
has a unique positive solution and that, provided that b∗1 ∈ (Ps, Ps + b∗0], there exists no other
b˜1 ∈ (Ps, Ps + b∗0] such that equations
L1U1(c) = 0, c ∈ (c, b˜1);
U1(c)− U1(b˜1−) + b˜1 − c = 0, c ≥ b˜1,
(A8)
together with the corresponding boundary conditions, are satisfied.
Verification of the optimality of strategies. Let r∗l , Pl, Ps ≥ 0 be such that µ − fi > 0 and
assume there exists b∗i such that Ui(0; b
∗
i ) = 0. Let the processes (C
∗
i , L
∗
i ) be a solution to the
following Skorokhod problem defined on [c, b∗i ]:
C∗i (t) = c+
∫ t
0
(µ− fi)ds+
∫ t
0
σdW (s)− L∗i (t); (A9)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ τ∗i , c ≤ C∗(t) ≤ b∗i ; (A10)∫ τ∗i
0
1{C∗i (t)<b∗i }dL
∗
i (t) = 0, (A11)
where τ∗i := inf{t > 0|C∗i (t) ≤ c}. The solution to the so-called Skorokhod Problem (A9)–(A11)
can be found, for instance, in Karatzas and Shreve (1991). The process L∗i is the local time of C
∗
i
at level b∗i . Its effect on the dynamics of C
∗
i is to reflect the latter downwards at level b
∗
i in order to
constrain it to [c, b∗i ]. From Equation (A11) we see that the mass of the measure dL
∗
i (t) is carried
by the set {C∗i (t) = b∗i }; thus, L∗i (t) is inactive whenever C∗i (t) < b∗i .
Now, let us show that Ui(c; b∗i ) = supL U
(xi,Pl,L)
0 (c), where x0 = 0 and x1 = Ps. Consider
an admissible payoff strategy Li and an initial level of liquid reserves c0 > c. Recall that the
corresponding liquid–reserves process evolves according to the stochastic differential equation
dCLi (t) = (1− θ)
(
(µ− fi)dt+ σdW (t)
)
− dLi(t), CLii (0) = c0.
Proceeding as in Appendix A.1, we use the generalized Itô formula applied to g˜i(t, c) = e−ρtUi(c; b∗i ).
Using the fact that LiUi(CLii (t); b∗i ) ≤ 0, we obtain, after simplifications,
e−ρt E
[
Ui(C
Li
i (t); b
∗
i )
]
≤ Ui(c; b∗i )− E
[∫ t
0
e−ρsU ′i(C
Li
i (s); b
∗
i )
(
dL˜i(s)
)]
+ E
∑
s∈Γi
e−ρs
(
Ui(C
Li
i (s+); b
∗
i )− Ui(CLii (s); b∗i )
) , (A12)
where L˜i(s) is the continuous part of Li. Let s ∈ Γi, then by the Mean Value Theorem and the fact
that U ′i(C
Li
i (s); b
∗
i ) ≥ 1, there exists cˆ ∈
(
CLii (s+), C
Li
i (s)
)
such that
Ui(C
Li
i (s+); b
∗
i )− Ui(CLii (s); b∗i ) = U ′i(cˆ; b∗i )
(
CLii (s+)− CLii (s)
)
≤ Li(s+)− Li(s) = −∆Li(s).
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Inserting the above expression into Expression (A12) we get
e−ρt E
[
Ui(C
Li
i (t); b
∗
i )
]
≤ Ui(c; b∗i )− E
[∫ t
0
e−ρsdLi(s)
]
.
By continuity, Ui(c; b∗i ) is bounded for c ∈ [c, b∗i ] and it grows linearly as c tends to infinity,
therefore,
lim
t→∞ e
−ρt E
[
Ui(C
Li
i (t); b
∗
i )
]
= 0.
This implies that, if we set dLi(t) ≡ 0 for all t ≥ τ∗i ,
Ui(c; b
∗
i ) ≥ E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−ρsdLi(s)
]
. (A13)
Next, we consider the strategy L∗i . Since the latter is the local time of C
∗
i at level b
∗
i , we may
assume that c ∈ [c, b∗i ]. Furthermore, L∗i is a continuous processes, and on (c, b∗i ) it holds that
LUi(CL
∗
i
i (s); b
∗
i ) = 0. Hence, for the strategy L
∗
i , Itô’s formula yields
e−ρtUi(C
L∗i
i (t); b
∗
i ) = Ui(c; b
∗
i ) +
∫ t
0
e−ρsσU ′i(C
L∗i
i (s); b
∗
i )dW (s)
−
∫ t
0
e−ρsU ′i(C
L∗i
i (s); b
∗
i )dL
∗
i (s).
(A14)
The measure dL∗i (s) is supported on {CL
∗
i
i (s) = b
∗
i } and U ′i(b∗i ) = 1. Therefore, taking expecta-
tions, Equation (A14) may be rewritten as
e−ρt E
[
Ui(C
L∗i (t)i; b
∗
i )
]
= Ui(c; b
∗
i )− E
[∫ t
0
e−ρsdL∗i (s)
]
.
Letting t tend to ∞ we have
Ui(c; b
∗
i ) = E
[∫ τ∗i
0
e−ρsdL∗i (s)
]
, (A15)
which is equivalent to Ui(c; b∗i ) = U
(xi,Pl,L
∗)(c). Form Equation (A13), we have that for any admis-
sible L, it holds that Ui(c; b∗i ) ≥ U (xi,Pl,L)i (c). Since L∗i is admissible, Equation (A15) yields
Ui(c; b
∗
i ) = sup
L
U
(xi,Pl,L)
0 (c).
Uniqueness of b∗0 and b∗1. Next we shown that b∗0 is the unique solution to U0(c; b) = max{ηA−
Pd − Pl, 0}. Recall that β2 < 0 < β1 and observe that
U0(c; 0) =
β1 + β2
β1 β2
=
(1− θ)(µ− f0)
ρ
> 0. (A16)
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The mapping b 7→ U0(c; b) is decreasing, as shown by the condition
∂U0(c; b)
∂b
=
1
β1 − β2
(
β2e
−β1b − β1e−β2b
)
< 0, for all b > 0.
Furthermore, limb→∞ U0(c; b) = −∞. Hence, the equation U0(c; b) = 0 has a unique solution.
In order to show there is no other b˜1 ∈ (Ps, Ps + b∗0] such that System (A8), together with
the corresponding boundary conditions, is satisfied, we define a parametric family of functions{
U1(· : b)
∣∣b ∈ (Ps, Ps + b∗0]} as the solutions to
L1U1(c) = 0, c ∈ (c, b);
U1(c)− U1(b−) + b− c = 0, c ≥ b,
together with the boundary conditions U ′1(b; b) = 1 and U ′′1 (b; b) = 0. By definition, U1(c; b1) = 0,
so we must show that U1(c; b) 6= 0 for all b 6= b1. We will do this by showing that the mapping
b 7→ U1(c; b) is strictly decreasing. We require the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 2. Let m be a solution to
Lm(c)− λm(c) := L2m(c) = 0, for c ∈ (c, b)
such that m′(b) < 0 and m(b) > 0. Then m′(c) < 0 for all c ∈ (c, b).
Proof of Lemma 2: Let us assume that m′(c) < 0 does not hold for all c ∈ (c, b), and let c be
the largest value on (c, b) that satisfies m′(c) = 0. By construction, c is a positive local maximum
of m. Since m′′(c) ≤ 0, however, we would require m(c) ≤ 0 in order to have L2m(c) = 0, which is
inconsistent with initial condition m(b) > 0. Therefore m′(c) < 0 for all c ∈ (c, b).

Next we consider two arbitrary payout thresholds b1 and b2 such that b1 < b2 and define
m(c) := U1(c; b1)− U1(c; b2), c ∈ [c, b1].
It is straightforward to show that m satisfies L2m(c) = 0 subject to the boundary conditions
m′(b1) = 1− U ′1(b1; b2) < 0 and m′′(b1) = −U ′′1 (b1; b2) ≥ 0. Furthermore
m(b1) = U1(b1; b1)− U1(b1; b2)
= U1(b1; b1)−
[
U1(b2; b2)−
∫ b2
b1
U ′1(c; b2) dc
]
.
(A17)
It follows from the Mean Value Theorem that there exists bˆ ∈ [b1, b2] such that∫ b2
b1
U ′1(c; b2) dc = U
′
1(bˆ; b2) · (b2 − b1) ≥ (b2 − b1).
Therefore, given that U1(b1, b1) = U1(b2, b2) = (1− θ)(µ− f1)/(ρ+ λ), we have
m(b1) ≥ U1(b1, b1)− U1(b2, b2) + (b2 − b1) > 0.
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Lemma 2 then implies that m′(c) < 0 holds for all c ∈ (c, b). Hence, b 7→ U1(c; b) is a strictly
decreasing mapping, and, thus, there exists a unique b∗1 satisfying U1(c; b∗1) = 0.
Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
In order to prove the equality of c∗0 and b∗1 we proceed as follows: Given a debt structure
(Ps, Pl, Pd) and a choice c0 of initial reserves level, the bank’s ex–ante value is given by the expression
V1(c0, Ps, Pl) = U1(c0)− c0 − (I − Pl − Ps − Pd).
Since U1 is concave, the first–order conditions are sufficient to determine the optimal choice of
c0; that is, c∗0 is characterized by the equation
∂
∂c0
V1(c0, Ps, Pl) = U
′
1(c0)− 1 = 0. (A18)
We know from Appendix A.2 that the unique admissible solution to Equation (A18) is precisely b∗1.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B Valuation of Contingent Claims
In this appendix we derive the pre–run values of bank equity and debt. Recall that:
L1g(c) = (1− θ)2σ
2
2
g′′(c) + (1− θ)(µ− f1)g′(c)− ρg(c), (B1)
where f1 := rdPd + rlPl + rsPs and g is a twice continuously–differentiable function.
B.1 Equity value
For a given debt structure (Ps, Pl, Pd), an interest rate on long–term debt rl and a liquidation
threshold c, consider a payout barrier b1 that satisfies c + Ps < b1 ≤ c + Ps + b∗0(Pl, rl). If the
run of repo creditors occurs in the region c ∈ (c+ Ps, b1], the bank survives and finds itself on the
payout–retention region (c, b∗0(Pl, rl)). In contrast, if the run occurs in the region [c, c + Ps], the
bank is liquidated and the shareholders receive
u˜1(c) = max{ηA+ c− Pd − Pl − Ps, 0}
upon the liquidation of the bank’s assets.
In principle, one must distinguish between three possible scenarios: In the first scenario, u˜1(c+
Ps) = 0, so that shareholders receive nothing should a run–triggered liquidation occur. Another
possibility is u˜1(c + Ps) > 0 but u˜1(c) = 0, which means that, should a run–triggered liquidation
occur, shareholders may receive a positive amount if the current level of liquid reserves is not too low.
The last possibility implies u˜1(c) > 0, which means that long–term debt is riskless and shareholders
will always collect a strictly positive amount in the event of liquidation. We present below the
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design of equity value for the case u˜1(c+ Ps) = 0, as it is the only case that manifests itself in our
numerical analysis.41
Recall that U0 denotes the post–run optimal equity value defined in Section 3.1. Before a run
occurs, the equity value satisfies the system
L1U1(c)− λU1(c) = 0, c ∈ (c, c+ Ps), (B2)
L1U1(c)− λ[U1(c)− U0(c− Ps)] = 0, c ∈ (c+ Ps, b1), (B3)
U1(c)− U1(b1) + b1 − c = 0, c ≥ b1, (B4)
subject to the following conditions:
U ′′1 (b1) = 0,
U ′1(b1) = 1,
lim
c↑c+Ps
U1(c) = lim
c↓c+Ps
U1(c),
lim
c↑c+Ps
U ′1(c) = lim
c↓c+Ps
U ′1(c).
Applying the Method of Variation of Parameters,42 we can show that a particular solution to
Equation (B3) is given by
H(c) = κ0
(
κ1e
β1(c−Ps) − κ2eβ2(c−Ps)
)
, (B5)
where
κ0 =
1
(1− θ)2
2
σ2
λ
(β1 − β2) , κ1 =
β2
β1
1
(β1 − γ1)(β1 − γ2)e
−β1b∗0 , κ2 =
β1
β2
1
(β2 − γ1)(β2 − γ2)e
−β2b∗0 ,
and γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic polynomial
(1− θ)2σ
2
2
γ2 + (1− θ)(µ− f1)γ = ρ+ λ.
Then, the equity value function can be defined as follows:
U1(c) =

A21(b1)e
γ1c +A22(b1)e
γ2c, c ∈ (c, c+ Ps),
A11(b1)e
γ1c +A12(b1)e
γ2c +H(c), c ∈ (c+ Ps, b1),
(1−θ)(µ−f1)
ρ+λ +
λ
ρ+λU
∗
0 (b1 − Ps) + c− b1, c ≥ b1,
(B6)
41Note that the formulas derived in this section do no apply to the set-up with payout restrictions. The reason is
that, under payout restrictions, the super-contact condition U ′′i (bi) = 0 does not necessary hold. The valuation of
the equity claim under payout restrictions is reported in Appendix B.3.
42The alternative way to get this particular solution would be to make a guess about its structure, i.e. H(c) =
h1e
β1c+h2e
β2c, and then recover the unknown constants h1, h2 by inserting this guess into the ODE (B3), collecting
terms to get the factors of eβ1c, eβ2c and setting the latter to zero.
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where
A11(b1) = −
[
γ2(1−H ′(b1)) +H ′′(b1)
γ1(γ1 − γ2)
]
e−γ1b1 ,
A12(b1) =
[
γ1(1−H ′(b1)) +H ′′(b1)
γ2(γ1 − γ2)
]
e−γ2b1 ,
A21(b1) = A11(b1)−
[
γ2H(c+ Ps)−H ′(c+ Ps)
(γ1 − γ2)
]
e−γ1(c+Ps) and
A22(b1) = A12(b1) +
[
γ1H(c+ Ps)−H ′(c+ Ps)
(γ1 − γ2)
]
e−γ2(c+Ps).
B.2 The value of long–term debt
Here we derive the market value of long–term, risky debt.43 Under the assumption that c+Ps <
b1 < c+ Ps + b
∗
0, the market value of long–term debt satisfies the following system:
L1D1(c) + rlPl − λ[D1(c)−D∗0(c− Ps)] = 0, c ∈ (c+ Ps, b1), (B7)
L1D1(c) + rlPl − λ[D1(c)− d˜1(c)] = 0, c ∈ (c, c+ Ps), (B8)
where D∗0 denotes the post–run value of long–term debt defined in Equation (9) of Section 3.1,
together with the following boundary and pasting conditions:
D′1(b1) = 0,
lim
c↑c+Ps
D1(c) = lim
c↓c+Ps
D1(c),
lim
c↑c+Ps
D′1(c) = lim
c↓c+Ps
D′1(c),
D1(c) = d˜1(c).
Let M1 denote a particular solution to the non–homogeneous Equation (B7):
M1(c) = χ0
(
χ11e
β1(c−Ps) − χ12eβ2(c−Ps)
)
+
rlPl
ρ
,
where
χ0 :=
λ
(1− θ)2
2
σ2
(
d˜0 − rlPlρ
β1eβ1b
∗
0+β2c − β2eβ2b∗0+β1c
)
,
χ11 :=
β2
(β1 − γ1)(β1 − γ2)e
β2b∗0 , χ12 :=
β1
(β2 − γ1)(β2 − γ2)e
β1b∗0 .
43This debt valuation strategy is valid for the set–up with no regulation, the set-up with liquidity regulation and
the set–up with the payout restrictions. In the set–up with leverage regulation, the construction of the value of
debt (not reported here) must allow for the multiple scenarios conditional on the liquidation value accruing to the
long–term debt creditors, which depends on the value of the liquidation thresholds c(klev).
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Let M2(c) denote a particular solution to the non–homogeneous Equation (B8) (as we show
below, it is computed differently depending on the seniority rules). The general solution to the
System (B7)-(B8) is
D1(c) =
{
B21(b1)e
γ1c +B22(b1)e
γ2c +M2(c), c ∈ [c, c+ Ps],
B11(b1)e
γ1c +B12(b1)e
γ2c +M1(c), c ∈ (c+ Ps, b1].
(B9)
In order to define coefficients B11(b1), B12(b1), B21(b1) and B22(b1), we introduce the following
auxiliary functions:
G1(b1) =
[
d˜1(c)−M2(c)
]
eγ1Ps +M2(Ps + c)−M1(Ps + c) + M
′
1(b1)
γ1
eγ1(Ps−b1)+γ1c,
G2(b1) = γ1
[
d˜1(c)−M2(c)
]
eγ1Ps +M ′2(Ps + c)−M ′1(Ps + c) +M ′1(b1)eγ1(Ps−b1)+γ1c,
F1(b1) = e
γ2(Ps+c) − γ2
γ1
eγ2b1+γ1(Ps−b1)+γ1c,
F2(b1) = γ2
[
eγ2(Ps+c) − eγ2b1+γ1(Ps−b1)+γ1c
]
,
g1 = e
γ1Ps+γ2c − eγ2(Ps+c) and g2 = γ1eγ1Ps+γ2c − γ2eγ2(Ps+c).
Solving the above system of boundary, value–matching and smooth–pasting conditions yields:
B12(b1) =
g1G2(b1)− g2G1(b1)
g1F2(b1)− g2F1(b1) ,
B11(b1) = −
[
M ′1(b1) + γ2B12(b1)eγ2b1
γ1
]
e−γ1b1 ,
B21(b1) = [d˜1(c)−M2(c)−B22(b1)eγ2c]e−γ1c and
B22(b1) =
G1(b1)−B12(b1)F1(b1)
g1
.
Impact of seniority rules. The value of long–term debt when it is senior to deposits can be
computed by using the above formulas with d˜1(c) = c + ηA − Ps and d˜0 = ηA. In this case, the
particular solution to Equation (B8) is given by
M2(c) = χ21c+ χ22,
where
χ21 =
λ
ρ+ λ
, χ22 =
rlPl + λ(ηA− Ps)
ρ+ λ
+ (1− θ)λ(µ− f1)
(ρ+ λ)2
.
Consider now the value of long–term debt when it is junior to deposits. Assume that Pd ≥ c+ηA,
which implies that long–term creditors will receive nothing in the event of liquidation, i.e. d˜1(c) = 0
and d˜0 = 0. The market value of junior long–term debt satisfies the above formulas with the
following modifications: M2(c) ≡ rlPlρ+λ , d˜0 = 0 and d˜1(c) ≡ 0.
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B.3 Equity value in the presence of payout restrictions
In this section we present our analysis of the effect that the regulatory constraint on the payout
policy introduced in Section 5.2 has on the ex–ante value of equity. Since we are now dealing
with a constrained optimization problem, the super–contact condition at the levels breg0 and b
reg
1
no longer applies. As a consequence, the ex–ante value of equity differs significantly from that in
Appendix B.1. For notational simplicity we assume that u˜0(0) = u˜1(Ps) = 0. The case with general
values is analogous. We first look at the impact of payout restrictions after the run on repos and
then analyze the general case on a second stage.
The impact of payout restrictions after the run. Recall that, in the unregulated case, the
equity value function U0 satisfies the ordinary differential equation
ρU0(c) = (1− θ)2σ
2
2
U ′′0 (c) + (1− θ)(µ− f0)U ′0(c) (B10)
on the region (c, b∗0). For each choice of rl and Pl, Equation (B10) has the general solution
A(rl, Pl)e
β1c +B(rl, Pl)e
β2c.
Furthermore, for c = 0 and U0(0) = 0 we have that A(rl, Pl) = −B(rl, Pl). Notice that the choice
of A(rl, Pl) determines the level of liquid reserves at which the condition U ′0 = 1 is satisfied, but it
bears no weight on where the second–order condition U ′′0 = 0 is fulfilled. This occurs whenever
β21e
β1c − β22eβ2c = 0, (B11)
an equation whose solution is our old acquaintance
b∗0 =
1
β2 − β1 log
(β1
β2
)2
.
In other words, b∗0 is the unique inflection point of the family of functions that satisfy Equation (B10)
and the boundary condition at zero. The fact that we impose the condition U ′0 = 1 precisely at
c = b∗0 is what allows for a C2–linear continuation of U0 over (b∗0,∞).
Assume now that the payout constraint breg0 > b
∗
0 is imposed, i.e. dividends can only be dis-
tributed at date t if the level of liquid reserves Cpi(t) ≥ breg. In terms of the corresponding equity
value function U0(·; breg0 ), this results in the Neumann boundary condition U ′0(breg0 ; breg0 ) = 1, which
follows from the same argument as in the unregulated case and yields
U0(c; b
reg
0 ) =
1
β1eβ1b
reg
0 − β2eβ2breg0
(
eβ1c − eβ2c) =: K(breg0 )(eβ1c − eβ2c), c ≤ breg0 ,
U0(c; b
reg
0 ) = U0(b
reg
0 ; b
reg
0 ) + (c− breg0 ), c > breg0 .
The impact of payout restrictions before the run. The level of liquid reserves at which
the shareholders will (optimally) start the firm is characterized by the FOC U ′1(c) = 1. In the
unregulated case, as we saw in Lemma 1, this corresponds precisely to the level c = b∗1. We show
below, however, that in the presence of payout restrictions, if breg1 > b
∗
1 the FOC is satisfied by
another level creg0 < b
reg
1 , which is then the shareholder’s optimal initial choice of liquid reserves.
For c = 0, u˜1(Ps) = 0 and a regulatory threshold b
reg
1 > b
∗
1, the pre–run equity value function
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U1(·; breg1 ) satisfies the following system:
L1U1(c; breg1 )− λU1(c; breg1 ) = 0, c ∈ (0, Ps), (B12)
L1U1(c; breg1 )− λ[U1(c; breg1 )− U0(c− Ps; breg0 )] = 0, c ∈ (Ps, breg1 ), (B13)
U1(c; b
reg
1 )− U1(breg1 ; breg1 ) + breg1 − c = 0, c ≥ breg1 , (B14)
together with the boundary conditions U1(0; b
reg
1 ) = 0, U
′
1(b
reg
1 ; b
reg
1 ) = 1 and smooth pasting at
c = Ps. We stress that not only is the condition U ′′1 (b
reg
1 ; b
reg
1 ) = 0 not imposed but, in fact, it
will not hold in this constrained scenario. As before, we denote by γ2 < 0 < γ1 the roots of the
characteristic polynomial
(1− θ)2σ
2
2
γ2 + (1− θ)(µ− f1)γ = ρ+ λ.
A crucial point is the following: for breg1 > b
∗
1 the equation U ′′1 (c; b
reg
1 ) = 0 has a unique solution
c(breg1 ) < b
reg
1 . This is the equivalent to Equation (B11) used above, but here the inflection point
does not coincide with b∗1, nor can it be computed in closed form. In order to find c(b
reg
1 ), we require
the solution to Equation (B13). To this end, we use the following particular solution:
Hr(c) =
λK(breg0 )
(1− θ)rsPsβ1 + λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A1H>0
eβ1(c−Ps) − λK(b
reg
0 )
(1− θ)rsPsβ2 + λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A2H
eβ2(c−Ps).
Observe that Hr(·) does not depend on the choice of breg1 .
Next we compute Uh(·; breg1 ), the homogeneous part of the solution to Equation (B13) (we focus
on the case where c(breg1 ) ∈ (Ps, breg1 ) since this is the only scenario that we follow in our simulations).
In other words, for c ∈ (Ps, breg1 ), we have
U1(c; b
reg
1 ) = Uh(c; b
reg
1 ) +Hr(c).
The explicit representation of Uh(c; b
reg
1 ) over (Ps, b
reg
1 ) is the following:
Uh(c; b
reg
1 ) = A11e
γ1c +A12e
γ2c,
where
A11 = A11(b
reg
1 ) = A21 −
H ′r(Ps)− γ2Hr(Ps)
γ1 − γ2 e
−γ1Ps ,
A12 = A12(b
reg
1 ) = Ge
−γ2Ps −A11(breg1 ),
where G :=
H ′r(Ps)− γ2Hr(Ps)
γ1 − γ2
(
1− e(γ2−γ1)Ps
)
−Hr(Ps),
(B15)
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and
A21 = A21(b
reg
1 ) =
γ2
[
H ′r(Ps)− γ1Hr(Ps)
]
eγ2(b
reg
1 −Ps) − γ1
[
H ′r(Ps)− γ2Hr(Ps)
]
eγ1(b
reg
1 −Ps)
(γ1 − γ2)(γ2eγ2breg1 − γ1eγ1breg1 )
− 1−H
′
r(b
reg
1 )
γ2eγ2b
reg
1 − γ1eγ1breg1
.
(B16)
We then have that
U ′′1 (b
reg
1 ; b
reg
1 ) = γ
2
1A11(b
reg
1 )e
γ1b
reg
1 + γ22A12(b
reg
1 )e
γ2b
reg
1 +H ′′r (b
reg
1 ).
A numerical analysis of the above expression revealed that U ′′1 (b
reg
1 ; b
reg
1 ) > 0 holds for levels of
breg1 > b
∗
1 such that condition b
reg
1 ∈ (Ps, Ps+breg0 ] holds. This, together with the facts U ′′1 (Ps; breg1 ) =
A21(γ
2
1 − γ22) < 0 and U ′′1 (·; breg1 ) ∈ C(0, breg1 ), allows us to apply the Intermediate Value Theorem
and conclude there exists c(breg1 ) ∈ (Ps, breg1 ) such that U ′′1 (c(breg1 ); breg1 ) = 0.
We are now in a position to conclude. As mentioned above, on the domain c < Ps we have that
U1(c; b
reg
1 ) = A21
(
eγ1c − eγ2c); therefore U ′′1 (Ps; breg1 ) < 0.44 On the other hand, as discussed above,
we have that U ′′(breg1 ; b
reg
1 ) > 0. Given that U1(·; breg1 ) is of class C2(0, breg1 ) this implies that
U ′′1 (c; b
reg
1 ) < 0 for c ∈ (Ps, c(breg1 )) and U ′′1 (c; breg1 ) > 0 for c ∈ (c(breg1 ), breg1 ).
In words, the graph of U ′′(c; breg1 ) has a sinusoidal shape over (Ps, b
reg
1 ) and U
′
1(c(b
reg
1 ); b
reg
1 ) < 1.
This, together with the fact that U ′1(0; b
reg
1 ) > 1, implies there exists c
∗
0(b
reg
1 ) ∈ (0, c(breg1 )) such
that U ′1(c0(b
reg
1 ); b
reg
1 ) = 1. By construction, the only other value of c that satisfies U
′
1(c; b
reg
1 ) = 1
is precisely c = breg1 . Notice that the above discussion not only delves in the impact that payout
restrictions have on the shareholders’ optimal choice regarding the initial level of liquid reserves,
but it also shows that the equity value function becomes concave–convex in the presence of the said
regulatory constraint.
Appendix C Computing the Liquidation Probabilities
In this section we describe the numerical approximation of the liquidation probabilities discussed
in Section 5.1. We follow a methodology that is in line with most of the analysis in this paper and
first approximate the liquidation probabilities after a run on repos has occurred. The numerical
procedure can then be easily extended to the setting in which repos are still present in the bank’s
balance sheet.
C.1 Computing the probability of survival after the run
Technically, it is slightly simpler to deal with the probabilities of survival, from which the
liquidation probabilities follow immediately. In other words, for a given strategy pi = (Ps, Pl, L) and
a time horizon T, we study the object
K0(t, c, T ) = P
{
τpi > T
∣∣Cpi(t) = c},
44This as long as the relation c < 1
γ2−γ1 log
(
γ1
γ2
)2
> Ps holds, which is a necessary condition for c(breg1 ) ∈ (Ps, breg1 )
to hold.
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i.e. the probability that the bank will not be liquidated before date T, given that its liquidity at
date t < T equals c.
In order to obtain a partial differential equation that describes K0, we mimic the way in which
we proceeded in Appendix A.1, noting that the presence of a time dimension results in a partial
derivative with respect to time when making use of the Itô formula. Let D := (c, b0), then for
given time horizon T (taking advantage of the stationary nature of the liquid–reserves dynamics
it is without loss of generality to consider the initial evaluation date to be t = 0), the mapping
(t, c) 7→ K0(t, c, T ) solves the following boundary–value problem45:
∂K0(t, c)
∂t
+
1
2
(1− θ)2σ2∂
2K0(t, c)
∂c2
+ (1− θ)(µ− f0)∂K0(t, c)
∂c
= 0,
K0(T, c) = 1 for all c > c,
K0(t, c) = 0,
∂K0
∂c
(t, b0) = 0.
(C1)
Observe that there is no term ρK0(t, c) on the left–hand side of the differential equation. This
obeys the fact that the probability of default is not discounted. The Dirichlet condition K0(t, c) = 0,
which simply states that the probability of survival contingent on having been liquidated is zero, is
precisely the reason why we work with the survival probabilities. The Neumann condition along the
boundary c = b0 corresponds to the reflection of Cpi at the said boundary. Namely, the probability
of survival cannot be increasing at c = b0, since the liquid reserves are not permitted to increase
beyond this level.
System (C1) is fairly standard and can be solved in numerous ways. We have chosen to use
a finite element method in the spacial domain D and a θˆ–scheme (see e.g., Wilmott (2006) for a
thorough presentation of θˆ–schemes) in time. A step–by–step description of how we have proceeded
can be found in Barth et al. (2015).
C.2 Computing the probability of survival before the run
Two additions must be made to the method described above so as to compute the survival
probabilities before the run on repos takes place, which we shall denote K1(t, c). First, the possible
jump of the liquid reserves as a result of a run has to be accounted for, which results in the following
boundary–value problem:
∂K1(t, c)
∂t
+
1
2
(1− θ)2σ2∂
2K1(t, c)
∂c2
+ (1− θ)(µ− f1)∂K1(t, c)
∂c
= λ
[
K1(t, c)−K0(t, c− Ps)
]
,
K1(T, c) = 1 for all c > 0,
K1(t, c) = 0,
∂K1
∂c
(t, b1) = 0.
(C2)
45From now on we drop the argument T to simplify notation.
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After rearranging we have that the partial differential equation in Expression (C2) can be written
as
∂K1(t, c)
∂t
+
1
2
(1− θ)2σ2∂
2K1(t, c)
∂c2
+ (1− θ)(µ− f1)∂K1(t, c)
∂c
= λK1(t, c) (C3)
if c ≤ Ps + c, whereas in the case Ps + c < c < b1 we have
∂K1(t, c)
∂t
+
1
2
(1− θ)2σ2∂
2K1(t, c)
∂c2
+ (1− θ)(µ− f1)∂K1(t, c)
∂c
= λ
[
K1(t, c)−K0(t, c− Ps)
]
. (C4)
The discretization of the boundary–value problem in Expression (C2) can be done separately
on the domains (0, T ) × (c, Ps + c) and (0, T ) × (Ps + c, b1), respectively. Then we can do exactly
as we did in Section C.1. The ex–ante probability of liquidation is simply p(T, c) = 1−K1(t, c).
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